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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1976, in Stone v. Powell, the Supreme Court held that a state 
prisoner who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth 
Amendment claim in state court, both at trial and on appeal, may not be 
granted federal habeas corpus relief on a claim that the trial court 
admitted evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.1  
Justice Powell’s opinion for the Stone majority emphasized the notion 
that the exclusionary rule, as derived from the Fourth Amendment, is not 
a personal constitutional right of the accused.2  Instead, the rule is merely 
“‘a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent effect.’”3 
The Court “weigh[ed] the utility of the exclusionary rule against the 
costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims”4 
and reaffirmed its earlier view that, at trial and on direct appeal, the 
deterrent effect achieved by excluding evidence obtained through 
unconstitutional searches and seizures outweighs any costs.5  In the 
context of collateral review, however, these costs persist unchanged 
while the incremental deterrent effect of exclusion becomes so attenuated 
that it is outweighed by the costs.6 
                                                     
*  Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University; Visiting Professor of Law, Washington 
University in St. Louis. B.A., J.D., University of Illinois; LL.M. Harvard Law School.  The author 
wishes to thank Assistant Professors Lucian Dervan and Christopher Behan for their insightful 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
 1. 428 U.S. 465, 481–82 (1976). 
 2. Id. at 494 n.37. 
 3. Id. at 486 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
 4. Id. at 489. 
 5. Id. at 493–94. 
 6. Id. 
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As a Fourth Amendment decision, Stone was unremarkable.  The 
cost–benefit balancing used by the Court predates Stone7 and has been 
relied upon since Stone to impose categorical limits on the application of 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.8  In addition, however, Stone 
contained language and suggested theories that one could use to argue 
that collateral review of state prisoner claims based on alleged violations 
of all prophylactic rules of criminal procedure is inappropriate unless the 
prisoner can show that he did not have a full and fair hearing in state 
court on the violation in question.9  The Stone Court observed that habeas 
review of state court convictions imposes its own costs, which add to the 
costs exacted by the exclusionary rule.10 
This Article argues that violations of prophylactic rules are not 
violations of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, and, 
therefore, federal courts lack jurisdiction over habeas claims based on 
alleged violations of such rules when the claimant had a full and fair 
opportunity in state court to raise the claim in question.  This Article 
further asserts that the equitable considerations that the Court noted in 
Stone—and that it has long used to raise and lower procedural barriers to 
habeas relief—should preclude a habeas court from reaching the merits 
of state prisoner claims based on alleged violations of prophylactic rules 
of criminal procedure if a state court afforded the prisoner a full and fair 
hearing on the violation in question. 
Following this introduction, Part II of this Article defines and 
discusses the concept of prophylactic rules.  Part III suggests that federal 
habeas courts lack jurisdiction over state prisoner claims that allege 
violations of prophylactic rules because persons in custody as a result of 
such violations are not “in custody in violation of the Constitution or 
laws . . . of the United States.”11  This proceeds in three subdivisions.  
                                                     
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448–49 (1976) (recognizing the costs of the 
exclusionary rule and balancing its utility as a deterrent against societal interests); Calandra, 414 
U.S. at 349 (weighing the costs of extending the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings against 
the benefits of the rule in that context). 
 8. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984) (examining the use of the 
exclusionary rule in civil deportation hearings); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920–25 (1984) 
(discussing the exclusionary rule’s applicability when police act in objectively reasonable reliance 
on a properly issued warrant); William A. Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: 
Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1373–78 (1981) (discussing cases 
involving questions related to the exclusionary rule that both predate and postdate Stone). 
 9. See, e.g., Stone, 428 U.S. at 476 (citing Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 333–36 (1915)). 
 10. See id. at 493–94 & n.35. 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).  Subsection (e) of § 2241 has been declared unconstitutional.  See 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (declaring § 2241(e) “an unconstitutional 
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Section A focuses on the origin and evolution of habeas corpus in 
England and the United States in an effort to demonstrate that the 
limitations on habeas review herein proposed are consistent with 
historical limitations on habeas corpus.  Section B discusses the Supreme 
Court’s expansion of federal habeas jurisdiction from its earlier role as a 
forum to challenge the committing court’s jurisdiction, to a forum in 
which a state prisoner could raise any federal constitutional claim.  
Section C develops the idea that habeas courts lack jurisdiction over 
claims based on alleged violations of prophylactic rules. 
Part IV suggests that a cost–benefit analysis similar to that used in 
Stone bars habeas review of claims based on alleged violations of all 
prophylactic rules if there has been a full and fair hearing on the alleged 
violation in state court.  Section A discusses the costs and benefits of 
prophylactic rules and describes the Court’s use of a cost–benefit 
balancing test to limit the impact of those rules.  Section B outlines the 
costs and benefits of habeas review and explores the Court’s equitable 
weighing of those factors as it has raised and lowered procedural barriers 
to habeas relief.  Section C explains how and why the Court should use 
its equitable powers to extend Stone to bar habeas review of most alleged 
violations of prophylactic rules.  Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
II. PROPHYLACTIC RULES AND REMEDIES 
A. Prophylactic Rules 
A prophylactic rule is a judge-made rule promulgated by the 
Supreme Court to help protect an underlying constitutional right where, 
for one reason or another, the Court believes that the law does not 
otherwise adequately protect the right.12  Prophylactic rules are to be 
contrasted with personal constitutional rights.  “A rule is properly 
classified as prophylactic only if it can be violated without necessarily 
violating the Constitution.”13  Prophylactic rules overprotect.14  They bar 
                                                                                                                       
suspension of the writ”).  This subsection, however, is not the focus of this Article. 
 12. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 176 (2002) (“The purpose of our Holloway [v. 
Arkansas] and [Cuyler v.] Sullivan exceptions from the ordinary requirements of Strickland [v. 
Washington] . . . is . . . to apply needed prophylaxis . . . .”); see also Jerry E. Norton, The 
Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 
282–83 (1998) (discussing the debate over the Court’s power to create such rules to protect social 
interests). 
 13. Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III 
Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 163 (1985); see also Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 
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much conduct that is otherwise constitutional because the Court believes 
that such conduct, if allowed, could lead to violations of constitutional 
rights15 and because it is easier to draw and enforce bright-line rules than 
to identify constitutional violations on a case-by-case basis.16  The 
difference between constitutional mandates and prophylactic rules is 
important because, theoretically, “prophylactic rules and incidental rights 
are fully open to revision by Congress, federal executive action, and state 
legislative, executive[,] or judicial action.”17 
To some extent, the difference between prophylactic rules and 
constitutional mandates is more semantic than real.  The Supreme Court 
declares what is mandated by the Constitution.  It also decides if 
implementation of a constitutional mandate requires any other rules18 or 
remedies.19 
The Court’s rationale determines whether a rule is prophylactic.20  It 
is not always obvious, however, which rules are prophylactic and which 
                                                                                                                       
(2003) (“[V]iolations of judicially crafted prophylactic rules do not violate the constitutional rights 
of any person.”). 
 14. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 209 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Like all 
prophylactic rules, the Miranda rule ‘overprotects’ the value at stake.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1220 (2010) (“The implicit assumption [for 
barring constitutional conduct] is that the [conduct] pose[s] a significantly greater risk of 
[constitutional violation].”); see also Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The 
Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 950 (1999). 
 16. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222–23; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984); cf. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 544–45 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (claiming that the argument 
that Miranda warnings will conserve judicial time and effort ignores the fact that the rule “leaves 
open such questions as whether the accused was in custody, whether his statements were 
spontaneous or the product of interrogation, [and] whether the accused has effectively waived his 
rights”). 
 17. Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and 
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1054 (2001).  
Judicial action may also revise prophylactic rules.  See, e.g., Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220, 1223 
(holding that the “judicially prescribed prophylaxis” announced in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
477, 484–85 (1981), designed to prevent the police from badgering a suspect into waiving his right 
to the presence of counsel lasts only fourteen days). 
 18. See, e.g., Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138 (1986) (“Like other ‘judicially created 
means of effectuating the rights secured by the [Constitution],’ we have restricted application of 
[North Carolina v.] Pearce to areas where its ‘objectives are thought most efficaciously served.’ . . . 
Where the prophylactic rule of Pearce does not apply, the defendant may still obtain relief if he can 
show actual vindictiveness upon resentencing.” (first alteration in original) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976))); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458 (“Unless adequate 
protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no 
statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.”). 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (calling the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule “a judicially created remedy”). 
 20. Grano, supra note 13, at 115. 
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are mandated by the Constitution.21  “[A] slight change in rationale can 
alter the proper categorization of a rule.”22  For example, in United States 
v. Wade, the Court held that an accused is entitled to the presence of 
counsel when placed in a police lineup.23  The Court emphasized that its 
“rules were required only in the absence of other devices to protect the 
underlying constitutional right to a fair trial.”24  Wade’s rationale fits 
exactly into the definition of a prophylactic rule—a bright-line rule that 
demands more of law enforcement than the Constitution requires, 
eliminates the need for case-by-case adjudication, and threatens the 
exclusion of evidence if procedures of some kind are not adopted to 
protect the underlying constitutional rights.25 
One year after Wade, in Simmons v. United States, the Court clarified 
its rationale concerning the right to counsel.26  Four years after Simmons, 
in Kirby v. Illinois, the Court transformed Wade into a constitutional 
mandate.27  Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion in Kirby unequivocally 
declared that “[t]he Wade–Gilbert exclusionary rule . . . stems from . . . 
                                                     
 21. Compare Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 196 n.2 (1987) (White, J., dissenting) (positing 
that Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), “is prophylactic in nature”), with Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 458 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[Bruton] was based, not upon the 
theory that this was desirable protection ‘beyond’ what the Confrontation Clause technically 
required; but rather upon the self-evident proposition that the inability to cross-examine an available 
witness whose damaging out-of-court testimony is introduced violates the Confrontation 
Clause . . . .”); see also Grano, supra note 13, at 158 (referring to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 
(1964), as a “case in which the Court is ambiguous concerning whether it established a prophylactic 
rule or recognized a procedural due process right”). 
 22. Grano, supra note 13, at 115. 
 23. 388 U.S. 218, 236–39 (1967). 
 24. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common 
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (1975) (citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 239). 
 25. See Grano, supra note 13, at 105–06 (defining a prophylactic rule as one “that functions as a 
preventative safeguard to [e]nsure that constitutional violations will not occur” and stating that the 
Court “may speak of the difficulty of detecting constitutional violations on a case-by-case basis or of 
the need to establish understandable [bright-line] rules for law enforcement officers to follow”).  
Interestingly, Professor Grano was of the view that Wade was “rooted squarely in the [S]ixth 
[A]mendment’s right to counsel provision” and was not a prophylactic rule.  Id. at 119, 120-21.  
Others, however, saw the rule as prophylactic.  See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 120 
(1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (calling the rule in Wade prophylactic). 
 26. 390 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1968) (“The rationale of [Wade and Gilbert] was that an accused is 
entitled to counsel at any ‘critical stage of the prosecution,’ and that a post-indictment lineup is such 
a ‘critical stage.’” (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 236–37)). 
 27. In Wade, the Court declared that “[l]egislative or other regulations, such as those of local 
police departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup 
proceedings and the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial may also remove the basis for 
regarding the stage as ‘critical.’”  388 U.S. at 239.  Such regulations would, presumably, also 
eliminate the need for counsel.  Kirby v. Illinois, however, constitutionalized that right.  406 U.S. 
682, 690 (1972) (plurality opinion). 
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the guarantee of the right to counsel contained in the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments”28 and becomes applicable only “at or after the 
initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings.”29 
The Court has directed most prophylactic rules at police conduct.  
Rules in this category include rules designed to regulate certain activities 
that implicate the Fourth Amendment,30 the warnings required by 
Miranda v. Arizona,31 the various rules the Court has designed to 
reinforce32 and refine33 Miranda’s protections, and some rules designed 
to regulate conduct that might compromise Sixth Amendment rights.34   
                                                     
 28. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688.  Kirby recognized both a Sixth Amendment right to counsel that 
applies to lineups that are critical stages of a prosecution because they follow the initiation of 
adversary judicial criminal proceedings and a separate Due Process right not to be subjected to 
lineups that are unnecessarily suggestive.  Id. at 690–91.  Nothing in Kirby suggests that any 
prophylactic rules are necessary to protect either right. 
 29. Id. at 689; cf. Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1845 (2009) (citing Wade as an example 
of a case where the Court mandated a rule that extended beyond the core constitutional right to 
counsel in order to encompass “various pretrial ‘critical’ interactions between the defendant and the 
State”). 
 30. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450–51 (1990) (discussing rules 
governing DUI checkpoints); see also Klein, supra note 17, at 1037–38 (arguing that cases requiring 
that inventory searches of individuals and vehicles be conducted according to standardized 
procedures are prophylactic rules that limit officer discretion) (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 
367 (1987); Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983)).  The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
is not a prophylactic rule; rather, it is a prophylactic remedy.  See infra notes 53–58 and 
accompanying text. 
 31. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600 (1975) (“This Court has 
described the Miranda warnings as a ‘prophylactic rule,’ and as a ‘procedural safeguard,’ employed 
to protect Fifth Amendment rights against ‘the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.’” 
(citations omitted) (quoting Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457, 
478)). 
 32. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981) (holding that if a suspect has 
been given his Miranda warnings and requested an attorney, any statement thereafter made by that 
suspect is inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief unless it is shown that the suspect 
thereafter initiated conversations with the police about the crime); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 
498 U.S. 146, 150 (1990) (stating that the Edwards’ protection does not cease simply because the 
suspect has consulted with a lawyer). 
 33. See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1220, 1223 (2010) (holding that the 
Edwards rule, a “judicially prescribed prophylaxis” designed to prevent police from badgering a 
suspect into waiving his previously asserted rights, lasts only fourteen days). 
 34. See, e.g., Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 175 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing 
that Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), overruled by Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 
(2009), was a “wholesale importation of the Edwards rule into the Sixth Amendment”). 
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Other prophylactic rules are directed at judges,35 prosecutors,36 and 
defense attorneys.37 
Some prophylactic rules create rebuttable presumptions that the 
government acted unconstitutionally.38  Others create so-called 
“conclusive presumptions.”39  Conclusive presumptions can result in the 
reversal of state court convictions even when the state can show that no 
constitutional violation occurred.40  
Prophylactic rules and remedies protect values embodied in the 
Fourth Amendment,41 the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination42 and 
Double Jeopardy43 Clauses, the Sixth Amendment’s Right to Counsel44 
                                                     
 35. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725–26 (1969) (“[W]henever a judge 
imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the [sentencing judge’s] reasons 
for his doing so must affirmatively appear.  Those reasons must be based upon objective information 
concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original 
sentencing proceeding.”), overruled in part by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989); see also 
Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 52–53 (1973) (adhering to Pearce, but declining to hold it to be 
retroactive). 
 36. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97–98 (1986) (shifting to the prosecution the 
burden of offering a neutral explanation for challenging African-American jurors upon a prima facie 
showing of discrimination by the defendant); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28–29 (1974) 
(extending Pearce to prosecutors). 
 37. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554–55 (1987) (explaining that in Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the Court “did not set down an independent constitutional 
command that all lawyers, in all proceedings, must follow,” but rather “established a prophylactic 
framework” to vindicate the defendant’s constitutional right to appellate counsel); see also Smith v. 
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 265 (2000) (characterizing the Anders rule as prophylactic and stating that 
“the States are free to adopt different procedures, so long as those procedures adequately safeguard a 
defendant’s right to appellate counsel”). 
 38. See, e.g., Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 142 (1986) (stating that the rule in Pearce 
may perhaps be characterized as “‘a presumption of vindictiveness, which may be overcome only by 
objective information . . . justifying the increased sentence’” (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 
U.S. 368, 374 (1982))). 
 39. Conclusive presumptions are rules of substantive law.  ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE 
LAW, § 4.08 (3d ed. 2011). 
 40. Grano, supra note 13, at 145 (suggesting that “Miranda created a conclusive presumption of 
involuntariness when its procedures are not followed, a presumption the state is not entitled to 
rebut”). 
 41. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 42. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e have 
created prophylactic rules designed to safeguard the core constitutional right protected by the Self-
Incrimination Clause.”); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (“The prophylactic 
Miranda warnings . . . are ‘not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but, [are] instead 
measures to [e]nsure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.’” (first and 
third alterations in original) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974))). 
 43. See, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368–69 (1983) (noting that two statutes that 
proscribe the same offense will be construed not to authorize successive punishments unless the 
legislature clearly expressed an intent to do so). 
 44. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 176 (2002) (observing that “[t]he purpose of 
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and Confrontation45 Clauses, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process46 and Equal Protection47 Clauses.  Some prophylactic rules even 
protect values embodied in other prophylactic rules.48  
B. Prophylactic Remedies 
Some constitutional provisions are self-executing; that is, they 
operate directly against government actors49 and, by their terms, 
command or invalidate certain actions.  For example, a conviction cannot 
stand if there was a complete denial of counsel or some other structural 
error in a defendant’s trial.50 
Most constitutional guarantees are not self-executing in this way.  
Consequences only attach to their violation if found in, or imposed by, 
some source other than the constitutional guarantee itself.51  Similarly, 
prophylactic rules do not, by their terms, prescribe a remedy for their 
                                                                                                                       
our . . . exceptions from the ordinary requirements of [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984)] is . . . to apply needed prophylaxis in situations where Strickland itself is evidently 
inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel”). 
 45. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126–28 (1968) (holding that, in a joint trial, 
a confession made by a non-testifying codefendant that implicates a defendant cannot be admitted 
into evidence against that defendant even if the jury is instructed to disregard any references in the 
confession to the defendant); see also Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 196 n.2 (1987) (White, J., 
dissenting) (recognizing Bruton as “prophylactic in nature”). 
 46. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725–26 (1969) (recognizing a defendant’s 
due process right to be free of vindictiveness and retaliatory motivations during sentencing), 
overruled in part by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). 
 47. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (reaffirming the principle that the 
Equal Protection Clause bars the use of race as a factor in jury selection). 
 48. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991) (referring to Edwards as 
providing a “second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right”).  In Minnick v. Mississippi, the 
Court held that Edwards’ protection does not cease simply because the suspect has consulted a 
lawyer.  498 U.S. 146, 154–55 (1990).  In dissent, Justice Scalia characterized Minnick as “the latest 
stage of prophylaxis built upon prophylaxis, producing a veritable fairyland castle of imagined 
constitutional restriction upon law enforcement.”  Id. at 166 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Montejo 
v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090 (2009) (declaring that “three layers of prophylaxis are 
sufficient”). 
 49. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 561–62 (1979) (barring discrimination when 
selecting a grand jury). 
 50. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (gathering examples of structural 
errors); see also Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1845 (2009) (observing that the Constitution 
mandates exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of some constitutional guarantees). 
 51. Legislation is often one such source.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (prescribing 
consequences for the deprivation of constitutional rights); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346, 2671–80 (2006) (providing a cause of action against the United States for the deprivation of 
constitutional rights). 
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violation.  To fill these gaps, the Supreme Court has created prophylactic 
remedies.  These take two forms. 
First, the Court has created prophylactic remedies to enforce certain 
constitutional commands.52  The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is 
such a prophylactic remedy.53  Even though the rule’s stated purpose is 
“to prevent, not to repair,”54 and it is not a personal constitutional right of 
the accused,55 the rule provides a de facto remedy for some Fourth 
Amendment violations.56  Because it attaches to a constitutional right and 
not to a prophylactic rule, however, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule extends direct relief only to individuals whose personal 
constitutional rights were violated.57  These individuals do not receive a 
windfall; instead, the remedy merely restores them to their pre-violation 
condition.58 
Second, to ensure that consequences attach to the violation of 
prophylactic rules, the Court has created another kind of prophylactic 
exclusionary remedy.  Remedies in this category implement prophylactic 
rules by excluding evidence obtained in violation of those rules.  The 
Miranda exclusionary rule—which excludes unwarned statements that 
were products of custodial interrogation, even if made voluntarily—falls 
into this category.59 
The exclusion of evidence as a prophylactic remedy imposes 
substantial costs.  If relevant, reliable, and trustworthy evidence is 
excluded, the truth-finding function of the courts is impaired.60  
Moreover, prophylactic remedies often extend relief to some people 
whose constitutional rights were violated as well as to some people 
                                                     
 52. See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 479 (1976) (explaining that the exclusionary rule is 
“‘simply a prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations’” (quoting 
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224 (1969))). 
 54. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). 
 55. Stone, 428 U.S. at 486; see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
 56. See generally William A. Schroeder, Restoring the Status Quo Ante: The Fourth 
Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Compensatory Device, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 653–60 
(1983) (discussing the available remedies for Fourth Amendment violations). 
 57. Grano, supra note 13, at 103–04. 
 58. See Schroeder, supra note 56, at 660 (“‘[F]ederal courts may use any available remedy to 
make good the wrong done.’” (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979))). 
 59. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306–07 (1985) (explaining the purpose behind the 
Miranda exclusionary rule); see also Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2003) (“We have 
likewise established the Miranda exclusionary rule as a prophylactic measure to prevent violations 
of . . . the Self-Incrimination Clause . . . .”). 
 60. See, e.g., Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351–52 (1990) (explaining the importance of 
the truth-finding function of the courts). 
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whose constitutional rights were not violated.61  In the latter case, the 
“remedy” does more than right a wrong—it provides the victim of the 
wrong with a windfall.  Indeed, it is an inherent attribute of most 
prophylactic constitutional rules and remedies that their “retrospective 
application [and enforcement] will occasion windfall benefits for some 
defendants who have suffered no constitutional deprivation.”62 
C. Constitutional Legitimacy 
Prophylactic rules and remedies raise serious questions of 
constitutional legitimacy when used by the courts to invalidate the 
conduct of state officials without a finding of an actual constitutional 
violation.63  Some have suggested that court-made rules designed to deter 
executive branch officials from violating the Constitution “intrude[] upon 
the separation of powers.”64  “[B]ecause the Court always imposes 
prophylactic rules on both the federal and state courts,” however, the 
paramount concern is federalism.65 
The Supreme Court “has supervisory authority over the federal 
courts, and [it] may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence and 
procedure that are binding in those tribunals.”66  The Supreme Court, 
however, has no supervisory authority over the state courts; if it is to 
impose rules on the state courts, its authority to do so must come from 
the Constitution.67 
The Constitution nowhere grants the Supreme Court the power to 
create prophylactic rules and make them binding on the states.  More 
specifically, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not say that 
“the judicial power of the general government shall extend to enforcing 
the prohibitions and to protecting the rights and immunities 
                                                     
 61. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 702 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (characterizing the Miranda warning requirement as a prophylactic rule and 
observing that “[b]ecause Miranda ‘sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself,’ it 
excludes some confessions even though the Constitution would not . . . [and] ‘provides a remedy 
even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm’” (quoting Elstad, 470 
U.S. at 306–07)). 
 62. Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973). 
 63. A thorough exploration of the constitutional legitimacy of prophylactic rules is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  Other authorities have explored this more in depth.  See Grano, supra note 13; 
Klein, supra note 17; Landsberg, supra note 15; Monaghan, supra note 24. 
 64. Klein, supra note 17, at 1052. 
 65. See Grano, supra note 13, at 124. 
 66. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000). 
 67. Id. at 438; Grano, supra note 13, at 129, 141. 
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guaranteed”68 by that amendment.  Rather, it says that these guarantees 
and rights “may be enforced by Congress by means of appropriate 
legislation.”69  Congress, however, has only rarely acted in this manner.70  
In fact, in the criminal procedure area, it has often attempted to rescind 
the rules imposed by the Supreme Court.71  These realities raise serious 
questions as to “whether the Court has the authority to require 
[prophylactic] rules of the state courts where it is unwilling to treat 
the . . . rule[s] as a necessary dimension of an underlying constitutional 
right.”72 
Perhaps out of recognition of the problems related to constitutional 
legitimacy, the Court has created a kind of in-between category of 
constitutionally mandated prophylactic rules.  While these rules can be 
characterized as prophylactic, they are not subject to revision because the 
Court has held that the Constitution commands the specific prophylaxis 
they impose.  The Miranda rule seems to fall into this category after 
Dickerson v. United States where the Court acknowledged earlier 
references to the “prophylactic” Miranda warnings,73 but concluded that 
Miranda was “a constitutional rule.”74  Rules that the Court has 
characterized as “extensions” of core constitutional rights75 may also fall 
into this category. 
                                                     
 68. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649–58 (1966) (upholding part of the 
Voting Rights Act as “appropriate legislation [under Section 5] to enforce the Equal Protection 
Clause”); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3087 n.23 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (characterizing as acts designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the Ku Klux 
Klan Act, Act of Apr. 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), 
and the Force Acts, Act of Feb. 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 433; Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140). 
 71. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970), invalidated by Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (“Congress 
may not supersede [Miranda] legislatively.”). 
 72. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 22; see also Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 446–50 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that unless the Court recognizes the underlying constitutional right, it may well 
overstep its authority by imposing prophylactic rules on the states).  Still, some suggest that such 
“rules can be adequately rationalized as constitutional common law.”  Monaghan, supra note 24, at 
23. 
 73. 530 U.S. at 437 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 
649, 653 (1984)). 
 74. Id. at 444. 
 75. See, e.g., Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1845–47 (2009) (calling the core right to 
counsel a trial right that protects the adversarial process and extending it to some “pretrial 
interrogations to ensure that police manipulation does not render counsel entirely impotent” (citing 
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468–69 
(1966))). 
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III. HABEAS JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS BASED ON ALLEGED 
VIOLATIONS OF PROPHYLACTIC RULES OR DENIALS OF 
PROPHYLACTIC REMEDIES 
A. Origin and Evolution of Habeas Corpus 
Related to the problem of constitutional legitimacy is the question of 
whether a federal habeas court even has jurisdiction over claims based on 
violations of norms not required by the Constitution.  Answering this 
question requires an examination of the history of habeas corpus. 
1. Early English Common Law 
The origins of habeas corpus are unclear.  The writ has been said to 
be “of immemorial antiquity.”76  It was part of the early English common 
law,77 and after the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215,78 habeas corpus 
gradually became the primary means for enforcing its guarantees.79 
Originally, the writ provided an avenue of relief to persons detained 
by executive authority without judicial trial.80  Gradually, it evolved into 
a judicial order directing a jailor to bring a prisoner into court.81  By the 
1600s, the writ had become the judiciary’s constraint on unfettered 
executive power and an avenue of relief for persons detained by 
executive authority without judicial sanction.82  For that reason, it 
became known as the “Great Writ.”83 
                                                     
 76. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (quoting Sec’y of State for Home Affairs v. O’Brien, 
[1923] A.C. 603 (H.L.) 609) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled in part by Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
 77. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982). 
 78. The Magna Carta decreed that no free man could be punished “except by the legal judgment 
of his peers or by the law of the land.”  MAGNA CARTA of 1215, art. 39, quoted in Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 740 (2008). 
 79. Id.  By the middle of the fourteenth century, Chancery courts used the writ to review the 
judgments of inferior courts.  Darnel’s Case, (1627) 3 Cobbett’s St. Tr. 1 (K.B.).  It was also 
frequently used by participants in various political struggles.  See LARRY YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION 
REMEDIES § 1:4, 9–10 (2010); Developments in the Law—Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 
1042–45 (1970). 
 80. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring), superseded by statute, 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254 (2006)); cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 740 (“Yet at the outset 
[the writ] was used to protect not the rights of citizens but those of the King and his courts.”). 
 81. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 741. 
 82. See id. at 741–43; Brown, 344 U.S. at 532–33 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 83. See Charles Alan Wright, Habeas Corpus: Its History and Its Future, 81 MICH. L. REV. 
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The English Parliament codified the writ in the Habeas Corpus Act 
of 1679, which afforded habeas relief to prisoners who had been 
arbitrarily arrested by the Crown.84  The 1679 Act, however, explicitly 
excluded persons who were in custody because they had been convicted 
of a crime.85  Persons in this category were left with only the common 
law writ.86  As a result, the English writ developed both statutory and 
common law forms.87  The statutory writ was primarily a vehicle for 
attacking executive detentions.88  The common law writ, in contrast, was 
available to challenge court judgments.89  The latter, however, was not a 
general writ of error, but could be used only to attack the jurisdiction of 
the convicting court,90 and it was available only to persons who were 
incarcerated.91 
As an overall scheme, this model made perfect sense.  If a person 
had been convicted of a crime in a court of competent jurisdiction, the 
law assumed the judicial process and its protections had been made 
available and that any errors could be corrected on appeal.  If, however, a 
person was held by the executive, that person had not had the benefit of 
judicial process and could use the statutory writ.  Similarly, if a person 
were held by order of a court which had no jurisdiction over him, no 
lawful judicial authority had passed on the validity of the detention. 
2. The Writ in the United States Before the Civil War 
Parliament never explicitly extended the English Habeas Corpus 
Acts to the colonies.92  Nevertheless, the writ appears to have been part 
of the common law in the colonies.93  Moreover, the United States 
Constitution specifically provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of 
                                                                                                                       
802, 802 (1983) (book review) (referring to justices from John Marshall to Sandra Day O’Connor 
calling it the “Great Writ”). 
 84. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 741–42 (citing Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2). 
 85. Developments, supra note 79, at 1045. 
 86. YACKLE, supra note 79, § 1:4, at 15; Developments, supra note 79, at 1045. 
 87. See YACKLE, supra note 79, § 1:4, at 9–15. 
 88. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742 (citing Habeas Corpus Act, 1640, 16 Car. 1, c. 10). 
 89. YACKLE, supra note 79, § 1:4, at 12. 
 90. Developments, supra note 79, at 1045. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 845 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The writ was established in the 
Colonies beginning in the 1690’s and at least one colony adopted the 1679 Act almost verbatim.”); 
see also YACKLE, supra note 79, § 1:4, at 15–16 (noting occasional references to the writ before the 
Revolutionary War). 
SCHROEDER FINAL 1/6/2012  9:52 AM 
244 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”94 
The language of the Suspension Clause suggests that the drafters of 
the Constitution assumed the right of habeas corpus to be inherent in the 
judicial power.95  Nonetheless, the Judiciary Act of 1789—which 
Congress passed in its first session and which established the federal 
courts96—gave prisoners in federal custody the right to petition for 
habeas corpus relief.97 
In 1807, in Ex parte Bollman, Chief Justice Marshall declared that 
the power to grant the writ derives from the Judiciary Act of 1789.98  
Two hundred years after Bollman, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme 
Court suggested that the writ contains a constitutional dimension.99  
According to the Boumediene Court, “the Suspension Clause . . . ensures 
that, except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have 
a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the ‘delicate balance of 
governance’ that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty.”100 
Neither the Constitution nor the Judiciary Act defines habeas 
corpus.101  It has long been clear, however, that habeas corpus is a civil 
remedy102 whose “essence,” according to the Supreme Court, allows “an 
attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody.”103  In the 
decades after the adoption of the United States Constitution, “English 
common law defined the substantive scope of the writ.”104  The early 
cases suggest, and most authorities agree, that prior to the Civil War, 
federal habeas corpus only allowed prisoners two types of claims.  First, 
                                                     
 94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 95. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742–43 (2008) (citing “evidence that the Framers deemed the writ 
to be an essential mechanism in the separation-of-powers scheme”).  The Clause may have been an 
effort to regularize the rules governing suspension in response to the fact that in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries “in England, habeas relief often was denied by the courts or suspended by 
Parliament.”  Id. at 741. 
 96. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2–11, 1 Stat. 73, 73–79 (1789). 
 97. The 1789 Act, however, did not authorize federal courts to issue the writ on behalf of 
prisoners held in custody under state law.  See Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. 103, 105 (1845). 
 98. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch.) 75, 94 (1807). 
 99. 553 U.S. at 795–97. 
 100. Id. at 745 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 545 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion)). 
 101. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82. 
 102. See Cross v. Burke, 146 U.S. 82, 88 (1892) (“It is well settled that . . . habeas corpus is a 
civil, and not a criminal, proceeding.”). 
 103. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 
 104. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 478 (1991), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2241–2254 (2006)). 
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they could challenge detentions by the federal executive that had been 
imposed without proper legal process.105  Second, they could challenge a 
federal judgment of imprisonment as a nullity on the ground that the 
imprisoning court lacked jurisdiction.106  Some courts also thought that a 
“full and fair hearing” was necessary before a habeas court would 
consider a prior judgment conclusive.107  Additionally, evidence suggests 
that even before the Civil War, American habeas courts routinely 
expanded the scope of review to allow prisoners to introduce previously 
unknown or unavailable exculpatory evidence.108  It was clear, however, 
that state prisoners could not access the federal writ.109  Since that time, 
“federal habeas corpus has evolved as the product of both judicial 
doctrine and statutory law.”110 
3. The Civil War Amendments 
In 1867, the Civil War had just ended, and the federal government 
faced a recalcitrant and unrepentant South.111  The Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution were designed 
to constitutionalize the results of that war.  As President Lincoln said in 
his second inaugural address, slavery, in some way, was the cause of the 
war.112  The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery.113  The war was 
also about States’ rights.  The federal cause had prevailed; the States’ 
rights cause had lost.  The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
                                                     
 105. See, e.g., Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307, 318 (1855) (McLean, J., dissenting). 
 106. See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202–03 (1830) (holding that a court 
cannot invalidate a judgment made by a court with final jurisdiction over the case). 
 107. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781 (2008) (“Justice McLean, on Circuit in 1855, 
expressed his view that a habeas court should consider a prior judgment conclusive ‘where there was 
clearly jurisdiction and a full and fair hearing; but that it might not be so considered when any of 
these requisites were wanting.’” (quoting Ex parte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. 969, 971 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 
1855) (No. 11,935))); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 718–19 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(calling this factor conclusive at common law). 
 108. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 780-81 (citing state court cases and Robinson, 20 F. Cas. at 971). 
 109. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 255–56 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(noting that prior to the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, state prisoners did not have access to federal 
habeas review). 
 110. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 183 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
 111. After the war, the Southern states enacted the so-called “Black Codes.”  See CLINT BOLICK, 
DAVID’S HAMMER 99 (2007).  Congress responded with the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  Id. 
 112. JOINT CONG. COMM. ON INAUGURAL CEREMONIES, INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE 
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE BUSH 142–43 
(Bicentennial ed. 1989). 
 113. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
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cemented that victory.  As the Supreme Court has long recognized, the 
Civil War Amendments to the Constitution “were specifically designed 
as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state 
sovereignty.”114 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment declares: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.115 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause appears to have been intended to 
prevent the states from intruding on the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States.116  This provision adopted a broad 
definition of citizenship to ensure that the states could not abrogate those 
provisions of the Bill of Rights mentioned in Dred Scott v. Sandford such 
as liberty of speech, the right to hold public meetings on public affairs, 
and the right to keep and bear arms.117  Some proponents of the 
Fourteenth Amendment felt the privileges and immunities of citizens, as 
“appl[ied] against [the] states,” encompassed all “the personal rights 
guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments of the  
                                                     
 114. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980); see also Ex parte Virginia, 100 
U.S. 339, 345 (1879) (the Civil War Amendments “were intended to be, what they really are, 
limitations of the power of the States and enlargements of the power of Congress”). 
 115. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
 116. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3063–83 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (discussing the history of the Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court held that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause protected only the privileges and immunities of federal citizens and not those of citizens of 
the states.  83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873).  Later, the Court narrowed the reach of this provision 
still further.  See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3060 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing cases).  Despite 
these limiting opinions, “[v]irtually no serious modern scholar . . . thinks this [is] a plausible reading 
of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”  Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 123 n.127 (2000). 
 117. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 258 
(1988); see also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3068 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Section 1 overruled Dred 
Scott’s holding that blacks were not citizens of either the United States or of their own state and, 
thus, did not enjoy ‘the privileges and immunities of citizens’ embodied in the Constitution. . . . It 
[also gave] examples of what the rights of citizens were—the constitutionally enumerated rights of 
‘the full liberty of speech’ and the right ‘to keep and carry arms.’”). 
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Constitution,”118 as well as “[o]ther rights declared elsewhere in the 
Constitution . . . [including] the ‘privilege’ of habeas corpus.”119 
The Due Process Clause seems to have been intended to guarantee 
that state actors followed their states’ own rules when taking a person’s 
life, liberty, or property.120  More specifically, this clause seems to have 
been intended to extend to African-Americans the same protections 
against arbitrary state action as were due persons generally.121  In 1867, 
however, due process only guaranteed a criminal defendant a full and fair 
hearing in a court with jurisdiction, where his rights were governed by 
general provisions of law applicable to all.122  In a civil case, due process 
guaranteed a full and fair hearing, after proper notice, in a court with 
jurisdiction, where each party’s rights were governed by general 
provisions of law applicable to all.123 
                                                     
 118. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 387–89 (2005); McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 
3071–79, 3083–84 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the application of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause).  See also id. at 3033 (majority opinion) (observing that “the chief congressional 
proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment espoused the view that the Amendment made the Bill of 
Rights applicable to the States and, in so doing, overruled this Court’s decision in Barron [ex rel. 
Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)]” (citing Adamson v. California, 332 
U.S. 46, 72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 
(1964))); cf. id. at 3033 n.10 (noting the contention that “‘there is support in the legislative history 
for no fewer than four interpretations of the . . . Privileges or Immunities Clause’”) (quoting David 
P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 406 (2008)). 
 119. AMAR, supra note 118, at 387–89.  See also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3071–79, 3083–84, 
3084 n.20 (Thomas, J., concurring) (There is “no reason to assume that the constitutionally 
enumerated rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause should consist of all the rights 
recognized in the Bill of Rights and no others. Constitutional provisions outside the Bill of Rights 
protect individual rights and there is no obvious evidence that the Framers of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause meant to exclude them.” (citation omitted)). 
 120. See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 483 (1982) (“We must bear in mind that 
no single model of procedural fairness, let alone a particular form of procedure, is dictated by the 
Due Process Clause.”); see also Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 (1915) (stating that the due 
process required by the Fourteenth Amendment is that process which is in accord with the 
established law of the state so long as it is not repugnant to the Constitution). 
 121. See Amar, supra note 116, at 104–07 (discussing the political and economic motivations 
that existed at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified).  The Due Process Clause was never 
meant to create substantive rights.  McDonald, 130 S. Ct at 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(characterizing as “legal fiction” the notion “that a constitutional provision that guarantees only 
‘process’ . . . could define the substance of . . . rights”). 
 122. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Frank, 237 U.S. at 326. 
 123. See Marchant v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 U.S. 380, 385–86 (1894) (finding that “errors alleged to 
have been committed by [a state] court in its construction of its domestic laws” did not present a 
federal question and that plaintiff was afforded due process because she had “the benefit of a full and 
fair trial,” in a court which had jurisdiction, where “her rights were measured, not by laws made to 
affect her individually, but by general provisions of law applicable to all in like condition”). 
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The Equal Protection Clause was designed as a non-discrimination 
clause.124  It granted to every person equal rights to the protections of the 
law.125  In addition, it conferred on all persons the benefits of positive 
law, including the rights to own property, enter into contracts, sue in tort 
for damages, seek relief in the courts, and engage in other legal activities 
and occupations on an equal footing.126  It was not meant to create 
substantive rights.127 
Because there was no reason to think the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantees would be self-executing or would be faithfully followed, 
Congress included Section 5.128  This provision gave Congress the power 
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment through appropriate legislation129 
that would “necessarily overrid[e]” any “principles of federalism that 
might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority.”130 
                                                     
 124. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3043 (observing that “§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains 
‘an antidiscrimination rule,’ namely, the Equal Protection Clause”). 
 125. Amar, supra note 116, at 63. 
 126. Robert J. Kaczorowski, Searching for the Intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 5 CONN. L. REV. 368, 374 n.13 (1972); see also Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 
22, 31 (1880) (“[The Equal Protection Clause] means that no person or class of persons shall be 
denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or classes in the same 
place and under like circumstances.”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES § 6.3.3, 503–05 (3d ed. 2006) (outlining those rights which have been considered 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 127. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“Congress does not enforce a 
constitutional right by changing what the right is.”). 
 128. See Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of 
Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 124–27 (1999) 
(outlining the original draft of the Fourteenth Amendment and the subsequent second draft which 
included a self-executing Section 5). 
 129. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 (The Ku Klux Klan Act) was designed to implement the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended in sections of 42 U.S.C.); see 
also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3087 n.23 (Thomas, J., concurring) (characterizing the Ku Klux Klan 
Act as an act designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment).  The Civil Rights Act of 1875 had a 
similar purpose, see 18 Stat. 335 (1875), but was largely nullified in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 
3, 32 (1883) (rejecting the Civil Rights Act of 1875 because it regulated private actors rather than 
state actors). 
 130. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980), superseded by statute, Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b 
(2006)), as recognized in Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009); 
see also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347–48 (1880) (observing that “there might be room for 
argument that the first section is only declaratory of the moral duty of the State,” but Section 5 
“gives authority for congressional interference and compulsion” of state actors in those matters 
embraced within its authority). 
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The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted on July 9, 1868.131  Of the 
states in the old Confederacy, only Tennessee ratified it.132  In response, 
the federal government divided the South into military districts and 
stationed federal troops there.133 
In theory, direct appeals from decisions in the state courts could have 
sufficed to vindicate the federal rights created by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.134  The Fourteenth Amendment, however, primarily 
targeted systemic abuses, and Congress, distrustful of Southern state 
governments and courts, thought more was necessary.135 
4. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867136 “seems plainly to have been 
designed to furnish a method additional to and independent of direct 
Supreme Court review of state court decisions for the vindication of the 
new constitutional guarantees.”137  It did not define habeas corpus,138 and 
it did not, by its terms, extend the habeas power to state prisoners.  
Rather, it extended the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts to 
include, “‘in addition to the authority already conferred by law,’” the 
power to issue the writ to “‘all cases where any person may be restrained 
of his or her liberty in violation of the [C]onstitution, or of any treaty or 
law of the United States.’”139 
                                                     
 131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 132. FONER, supra note 117, at 261, 268–69. 
 133. Id. at 276. 
 134. See, e.g., Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 448–49 (1900) (overturning a state court decision 
on direct appeal based on equal protection grounds). 
 135. See Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13–
14 (2010). 
 136. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. 
 137. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 
72 (1977); Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559–60 (1883) (providing that “the writ of habeas 
corpus . . . is not a proceeding in th[e] prosecution [of a criminal defendant].  On the contrary, it is a 
new suit brought by [the defendant] to enforce a civil right”).  Giving the federal judiciary the power 
to enforce civil rights was thought preferable to giving that power to either Congress or to a 
permanent national bureaucracy, or to maintaining a standing army in the South.  FONER, supra note 
117, at 258. 
 138. Fay, 372 U.S. at 415. 
 139. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 252 n.2 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting 
§ 1, 14 Stat. at 385).  The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was “the direct ancestor of contemporary 
habeas statutes.”  Id. at 252.  Until the 1996 amendments added through the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 had undergone only minor 
changes.  See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 97 (2006) (stating that the AEDPA gave habeas 
review a different look than what previously existed).  The core of the Act remains essentially 
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The legal basis for the Act of 1867 remains unclear.140  The Supreme 
Court, however, quickly recognized its breadth.  “This legislation is of 
the most comprehensive character.  It brings within the habeas corpus 
jurisdiction of every court and of every judge every possible case of 
privation of liberty contrary to the National Constitution, treaties, or 
laws.  It is impossible to widen this jurisdiction.”141 
B. Expansion of Habeas Jurisdiction: From Challenging the Trial 
Court’s Jurisdiction to Challenging All Constitutional Violations 
When the 1867 Congress added the Habeas Corpus Act, “‘it 
undoubtedly intended . . . to incorporate the common-law uses and 
functions of this remedy.’”142  Consistent with that intent, for some time 
after the Act of 1867, the Court limited the availability of habeas relief to 
jurisdictional claims.143  The Court soon expanded the term jurisdiction, 
however, to encompass sentences imposed in violation of the Double 
                                                                                                                       
unchanged.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2255 (2006). 
 140. Even though the Act of 1867 preceded the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
1868, both seem to have been part of a larger congressional package.  The Act was probably seen by 
many of its supporters as “appropriate legislation” under Section 5, but became law more quickly 
than the Fourteenth Amendment because the latter had to be ratified by the states.  It is also possible 
that the Act was simply a freestanding effort to expand the powers of the federal judiciary.  See Fay, 
372 U.S. at 415 (noting that the Act of 1867 when “viewed against the background of post-Civil War 
efforts in Congress to deal severely with the States of the former Confederacy” suggests that 
Congress was intent on expanding federal habeas review).  Because Congress did not extend general 
federal question jurisdiction to the federal courts until 1875, Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 
470 (1875), Congress might have wanted to allow a defendant who claimed a constitutional 
violation, and thereby raised a federal question in a state court, to be able to invoke habeas 
jurisdiction immediately without allowing the case to run its course in the state system.  But cf. Ex 
parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886) (observing that considerations of federal–state relations will 
ordinarily suggest non-intervention until the state proceeding has run its course). 
 141. Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325–26 (1868).  It has occasionally been 
suggested that once Congress extended habeas review to state prisoners, its ability to “suspend” that 
review was limited by the Suspension Clause.  See, e.g., Royall, 117 U.S. at 249; Jordan Steiker, 
Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 865–66 (1994). 
 142. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 253 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Dallin H. Oaks, Legal 
History in the High Court—Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451, 452 (1966)). 
 143. See, e.g., Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272, 275 (1895) (stating that whether the statute is in 
violation of the state constitution is not a federal question); In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372, 375–76 
(1890) (granting habeas review on jurisdictional grounds); see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 
436, 444–46 (1986) (briefly examining the historical limitations of habeas review), superseded by 
statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254 (2006)); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 371, 377 (1880) 
(explaining that habeas review is limited to those courts with jurisdiction to hear the case); 
Developments, supra note 79, at 1048–49 (same). 
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Jeopardy Clause144 and convictions obtained under an unconstitutional 
statute.145  The law remained in essentially this posture until 1915.  That 
year, in Frank v. Mangum,146 the Court took the first step in a long 
journey that culminated, almost fifty years later, in the expansion of 
habeas jurisdiction almost beyond recognition. 
In Frank, the Court examined Leo Frank’s claim that the guilty 
verdict returned against him by a Georgia jury and his subsequent death 
sentence—both affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court—were the result 
of the jury being intimidated by a mob.147  The United States Supreme 
Court held that a federal court hearing a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus may “look behind and beyond the record of [a prisoner’s] 
conviction to a sufficient extent to test the jurisdiction of the state court 
to proceed to judgment.”148  That jurisdiction, said the Court, could be 
lost, and a new trial would be warranted, if the accused did not receive 
due process of law,149 unless the state made available to the accused a 
“corrective process” such as appellate review.150  The majority found that 
Georgia’s courts “accorded to [Frank] the fullest right and opportunity to 
be heard according to the established modes of procedure,” including 
                                                     
 144. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176–78 (1874); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465, 476 n.8 (1976) (characterizing this exception as encompassing “allegedly illegal sentences”). 
 145. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 376–77 (holding that enforcement of an unconstitutional law deprives 
the convicting court of jurisdiction because such a law is void); see also Royall, 117 U.S. at 248–49 
(noting that a defendant could use federal habeas review to challenge the validity of the statute under 
which he was convicted). 
In the first fifty years after the Civil War, very few state prisoners sought habeas relief in the 
federal courts.  This was probably because the freed blacks who were the intended beneficiaries of 
the Act of 1867 were too intimidated, too poor, or too uneducated to take advantage of it.  See 
FONER, supra note 117, at 425–44.  Moreover, by 1873, the Court and Congress were beginning to 
lose interest in both enforcing the civil rights laws and protecting freed blacks in the South.  See id. 
at 524–34.  This loss of interest accelerated after the withdrawal of federal troops from the South 
pursuant to the compromise that followed the disputed presidential election of 1876.  See id. at 564–
82; LLOYD ROBINSON, THE STOLEN ELECTION: HAYES VERSUS TILDEN—1876, at 213–29 (1968). 
 146. 237 U.S. 309 (1915). 
 147. Id. at 324–25. 
 148. Id. at 331. 
 149. Id. at 327.  The Court declared that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not impose upon the States any particular form or mode of procedure.  Id. at 326–27.  Due 
process, in the constitutional sense, is provided if 
a criminal prosecution [is] based upon a law not in itself repugnant to the Federal 
Constitution, and [is] conducted according to the settled course of judicial proceedings as 
established by the law of the State, so long as it includes notice, and a hearing, or an 
opportunity to be heard, before a court of competent jurisdiction, according to established 
modes of procedure. 
Id. at 326. 
 150. Id. at 327, 335. 
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appellate review,151 rejected his claims that his trial was dominated by a 
mob, and affirmed his conviction.152 
Despite its outcome, Frank opened the door to a broader federal 
review of state court convictions.  Eight years later, six African-
Americans imprisoned in Arkansas walked through that door.  In 1923, 
in Moore v. Dempsey, the six state prisoners alleged that a mob had 
dominated their trial.153  Like Frank, the defendants in Moore had 
appealed to the state supreme court, and it had affirmed their 
convictions.154 
In an opinion by Justice Holmes—who had dissented in Frank—the 
Moore Court read Frank as establishing the rule that where “a trial is 
dominated by a mob so that there is an actual interference with the 
course of justice, there is a departure from due process of law.”155  Even 
then, though, “the corrective process supplied by the State may be so 
adequate that interference by habeas corpus ought not to be allowed.”156  
Holmes concluded that the corrective process in question did not seem 
“sufficient to allow a Judge of the United States to escape the duty of 
examining the facts for himself when if true as alleged they make the  
 
                                                     
 151. Id. at 345.  His counsel  
twice . . . moved the trial court to grant a new trial, and once to set aside the verdict as a 
nullity; three times he has been heard upon appeal before the court of last resort of that 
State, and in every instance the adverse action of the trial court has been affirmed. 
Id. at 344. 
 152. Id. at 345. 
 153. 261 U.S. 86, 87 (1923). 
 154. Id. at 91.  Many years later, in Fay v. Noia, the Supreme Court characterized Moore and 
Frank as “almost identical in all pertinent respects.”  372 U.S. 391, 421 (1963), overruled in part by 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).  The underlying facts, however, were quite different.  
Although Frank was tried in a mob-dominated atmosphere, Frank, 237 U.S. at 347 (Holmes, J., 
dissenting), he was a relatively well-off white man who received most of the process that was due a 
defendant who was charged with a serious crime in Georgia.  Id. at 345.  His trial lasted four weeks, 
and he had the assistance of several attorneys who worked diligently on his behalf.  Id. at 312 
(statement of Justice Pitney preceding the opinion of the Court).  In contrast, the defendants in 
Moore were poor African-Americans, 261 U.S. at 87, members of the group the Fourteenth 
Amendment was clearly designed to protect.  The proceedings “were only a form”—“a mask”—in 
which the process due under Arkansas law was provided in name only.  Id. at 87, 91.  At trial, the 
Moore defendants were assigned an attorney who did almost nothing on their behalf, and the state 
corrective process was deficient.  Id. at 92. 
 155. Moore, 261 U.S. at 90–91 (citing Frank, 237 U.S. at 335). 
 156. Id. at 90–91.  In Fay, the Court recognized that Moore “substantially repudiated” Frank.  
372 U.S. at 421.  Professor Bator seems correct, however, in saying that Moore did not, in fact, 
discredit Frank.  See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 488–89 (1963). 
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trial absolutely void.”157  The Moore Court therefore held that the federal 
district court should have granted the habeas petition.158 
Taken together, Frank and Moore probably illustrate the way the 
radical Republicans, and many others, intended the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 to 
operate.159  In both cases, the Court emphasized that mere errors of law 
committed by the trial court cannot be reviewed by habeas corpus.160  In 
Frank, however, the defendant was given “the fullest right and 
opportunity to be heard according to the established modes of 
procedure.”161  He therefore received all the process that was due him 
under the Constitution.  In contrast, the Moore defendants had no real 
trial at all, and the state’s corrective processes did not remedy that 
failure.162  Because the state denied the Moore defendants a full and fair 
hearing on their claims, it denied them the basic process that, under the 
Constitution, was due to all criminal defendants.163 
In 1938, in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court affirmed that “habeas corpus 
cannot be used as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities—
not involving the question of jurisdiction—occurring during the course 
of trial.”164  Even as it made this statement, however, the Court greatly 
expanded the concept of jurisdiction by characterizing the Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel as “an essential 
jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court’s authority to deprive an 
                                                     
 157. Moore, 261 U.S. at 92. 
 158. Id. at 91–92. 
 159. “Reconstruction’s primary goal [was] to prevent states from infringing on individual 
liberties. . . . Before the Civil War, states could operate virtually unfettered within their sovereign 
domain.  Not so after Reconstruction.”  Josh Blackman & Ilya Shapiro, Keeping Pandora’s Box 
Sealed: Privileges or Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending the Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms to the States, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 63–64 (2009). 
 160. Frank, 237 U.S. at 326 (“Mere errors in point of law, however serious, committed by a 
criminal court in the exercise of its jurisdiction over a case properly subject to its cognizance, cannot 
be reviewed by habeas corpus.”); Moore, 261 U.S. at 91 (“It certainly is true that mere mistakes of 
law in the course of a trial are not to be corrected [by habeas corpus].”). 
 161. Frank, 237 U.S. at 345. 
 162. Moore, 261 U.S. at 92.  In 1996, the AEPDA codified the principles of Frank and Moore 
under the rubric of exhaustion of remedies.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) (exhaustion is not 
necessary where “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the 
applicant”). 
 163. Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781 (2008) (observing that “the necessary scope of 
habeas review in part depends upon the rigor of any earlier proceedings accords with our test for 
procedural adequacy in the due process context”). 
 164. 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938). 
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accused of his life or liberty.”165  The Court found, therefore, that a 
federal prisoner was entitled to habeas relief if he could show that his 
trial and conviction occurred in violation of his constitutional right to the 
assistance of counsel.166 
In 1942, in Waley v. Johnston, the Supreme Court “openly discarded 
the concept of jurisdiction—by then more a fiction than anything 
else”167—and explicitly expanded the availability of habeas relief to 
encompass more than jurisdictional defects.168  The Court noted that the 
facts relied upon for relief were not in the trial court’s record169 and held 
that habeas relief “is not restricted to those cases where the judgment of 
conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render 
it.”170  In addition, it extends “to those exceptional cases where the 
conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the 
accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his 
rights.”171 
Read narrowly, with the focus on its facts, Waley merely affirms 
Frank and Moore—habeas corpus is not appropriate where corrective 
processes to preserve the defendant’s due process rights remain available 
within the jurisdiction.  Read broadly, with the focus on its language, 
Waley goes far beyond Frank and Moore by providing habeas relief 
whenever the constitutional rights of an accused are violated and “the 
writ is the only effective means of preserving [those] rights.”172 
In 1953, in Brown v. Allen, the Court adopted the broad view of 
Waley and suggested that any cognizable federal constitutional claim 
raised by a state prisoner could be heard in federal court on a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus even if the claims had been adjudicated in state 
court.173  Ten years later, in Fay v. Noia, the Court removed the final 
barrier to broad collateral reexamination of state criminal convictions 
                                                     
 165. Id. at 467. 
 166. Id. at 469. 
 167. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977) (discussing Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 
(1942) (per curiam)). 
 168. Waley, 316 U.S. at 104–05. 
 169. Id. at 104.  Waley pleaded guilty in federal court to a kidnaping charge and was sentenced.  
Id. at 102.  While in custody, he petitioned for habeas corpus on the ground that his plea was a result 
of coercion, intimidation, and threats made by an FBI agent.  Id. 
 170. Id. at 104–05. 
 171. Id. at 105. 
 172. Id. 
 173. 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953) (finding that state court adjudications on federal constitutional 
issues are not res judicata). 
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and proclaimed “federal court jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation 
of an unconstitutional restraint.”174 
If any doubt remained as to the meaning of Brown and Fay, 
Wainwright v. Sykes removed it in 1977.  That year, the Court found that 
since Brown v. Allen, it has been the rule that the federal habeas 
petitioner who claims he is detained pursuant to a final judgment of a 
state court in violation of the United States Constitution is entitled to 
have the federal habeas court make its own independent determination 
of his federal claim, without being bound by the determination on the 
merits of that claim reached in the state proceedings.175 
C. Federal Court Habeas Jurisdiction over Claims Based on 
Prophylactic Rules 
In 1948, Congress amended the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.176  Like 
its predecessor, the new text granted the right to federal habeas corpus 
relief to any state prisoner “in custody in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties of the United States.”177  Congress retained this language 
in the 1996 amendments contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act.178 
In his Stone dissent, Justice Brennan characterized the majority’s 
decision as one that denied federal courts “habeas jurisdiction over 
claims of Fourth Amendment violations brought by state prisoners” on 
the grounds that such persons “are not, as a matter of statutory 
construction, ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of 
                                                     
 174. 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
 175. 433 U.S. at 87 (citation omitted).  See also id. at 79 (“In Brown v. Allen, it was made 
explicit that a state prisoner’s challenge to the trial court’s resolution of dispositive federal issues is 
always fair game on federal habeas.” (citation omitted)). 
 176. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §§ 2241–55, 62 Stat. 869, 964–68 (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–54 (2006)). 
 177. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).  State court judgments other than criminal convictions, including an 
order of civil commitment or civil contempt, may give rise to a person’s being “in custody within the 
meaning of the federal habeas statute.”  Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001). 
 178. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c).  “The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner 
unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States . . . .”  Id.  Section 2254(a), provides: 
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 
Id. § 2254(a). 
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the United States.’”179  The Stone majority dismissed this claim as 
“hyperbole” and responded that the “decision does not mean that the 
federal court lacks jurisdiction over such a claim, but only that the 
application of the rule is limited to cases in which there has been both [a 
deprivation of a full and fair adjudication at trial and direct review] and a 
Fourth Amendment violation.”180 
“During the period in which the substantive scope of the writ was 
expanded, the Court did not consider whether exceptions to full review 
might exist with respect to particular categories of constitutional 
claims.”181  Scholarship, however, “has cast grave doubt on” the Fay 
Court’s claim that “we have consistently held that federal court 
jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation of an unconstitutional 
restraint.”182  In fact, as shown in the preceding section: 
The scope of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners has evolved from 
a quite limited inquiry into whether the committing state court had 
jurisdiction, to whether the applicant had been given an adequate 
opportunity in state court to raise his constitutional claims, and finally 
to actual redetermination in federal court of state court rulings on a 
wide variety of constitutional contentions.183 
“[C]ommon-law habeas corpus was, above all, an adaptable remedy.  
Its precise application and scope changed depending upon the 
circumstances.”184  There is thus no inherent reason that a particular kind 
or category of claim cannot be excluded from federal habeas jurisdiction.  
For example, the Court could decline to extend habeas jurisdiction to any 
                                                     
 179. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S 465, 503–05 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 478 
n.11 (majority opinion)). 
 180. Id. at 494 n.37 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).  See also Withrow v. Williams, 507 
U.S. 680, 686 (1993) (citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 n.37) (stating that “Stone’s limitation on federal 
habeas relief was not jurisdictional in nature”).  The Stone Court acknowledged an argument could 
be made that a federal habeas court lacks jurisdiction over such claims, but it did not address it 
because it was not presented to the Court on the petition for certiorari.  428 U.S. at 481 n.15. 
 181. Stone, 428 U.S. at 478–79. 
 182. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 252–53 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting 
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 
(1977)).  “At the time the privilege of the writ was written into the Federal Constitution it was settled 
that the writ lay to test any restraint contrary to fundamental law, which in England stemmed 
ultimately from Magna Charta but in this country was embodied in the written Constitution.”  Id. 
(quoting Fay, 372 U.S. at 426). 
 183. Id. at 255–56 (citations omitted).  As the Court incorporated more and more provisions of 
the Bill of Rights against the states through the Due Process Clause, any petitioner who claimed that 
a state denied him one of the new rights had a plausible due process claim. 
 184. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008). 
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and all Fourth Amendment claims.  If this were the rule, then the federal 
courts would “be powerless to consider even those Fourth Amendment 
claims that had not been fully and fairly litigated in the state courts.”185 
The Court could also decline jurisdiction over claims based on a state 
court’s failure to enforce a prophylactic rule or prophylactic remedy.  
Habeas jurisdiction has long extended to persons “in custody in violation 
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”186  If the 
exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence were a personal 
constitutional right of the accused, then the use of that evidence against 
him would seemingly result in his being held in custody in violation of 
the Constitution—which would entitle him to habeas relief.187  The 
Court’s opinion in Stone, however, placed heavy emphasis on the idea 
that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is not a personal 
constitutional right of the accused but, instead, is “a judicially created 
means of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment.”188  
Similarly, prophylactic remedies that attach to prophylactic rules are 
“judicially created” means of effectuating those rules. 
“A rule is properly classified as prophylactic only if it can be 
violated without necessarily violating the Constitution.”189  Similarly, a 
remedy is prophylactic only if it can be withheld without necessarily 
violating the Constitution.  These rules and remedies are not 
constitutional commands; they are judicially created means of 
effectuating those commands.  State prisoners erroneously denied the 
benefits of prophylactic exclusionary remedies not required by the 
Constitution are therefore not in custody in violation of the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States; federal habeas jurisdiction does not 
extend to such claims.190 
Even if one views prophylactic rules as a kind of federal common 
law,191 “[s]tate violations of federal common law rules are generally not 
                                                     
 185. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 221 n.5 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 186. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006). 
 187. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1979) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal 
court must entertain a claim by a state prisoner that he or she is being held in ‘custody in violation of 
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”). 
 188. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 486 (1976). 
 189. Grano, supra note 13, at 163. 
 190. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 439 n.3 (2000) (using Miranda claims as an 
example). 
 191. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 23 (suggesting that the Supreme Court has the “power to 
fashion a substructure of implementing ‘legislative’ rules—rules that are admittedly not integral 
parts of the Constitution and that go beyond its minimum requirements . . . , [and such rules] can be 
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cognizable in federal habeas proceedings.”192  Because the Supreme 
Court has no supervisory authority over the state courts, its power to 
intervene in state judicial proceedings extends only “to correct wrongs of 
constitutional dimension.”193  As the Court noted in Stone, “the 
established rule” provides that state prisoners may not assert non-
constitutional claims in collateral proceedings.194 
Finally, the Stone Court could have taken a third position.  In 
Dickerson, the Court said that “‘federal judges . . . may not require the 
observance of any special procedures’ in state courts ‘except when 
necessary to assure compliance with the dictates of the Federal 
Constitution.’”195  Implicit in this statement is the proposition that the 
Supreme Court may impose some procedural requirements on the states 
where necessary to secure underlying constitutional rights.  Because, 
theoretically, “prophylactic rules . . . are fully open to revision by 
Congress, federal executive action, and state legislative, executive[,] or 
judicial action,” some argue that “the use of prophylactic rules . . . rather 
than pure constitutional interpretation [and mandate] gives the states . . . 
[the] opportunity for diversity and experimentation.”196  Such rules 
amount to the Court’s requiring that states protect a constitutional right, 
offering one solution, acknowledging that other solutions exist, and, 
ultimately, warning that a failure to take action of some kind would 
violate the protections of due process as required by the Constitution.197 
When the Supreme Court incorporates a constitutional provision 
against the states through the Due Process Clause and acknowledges that 
multiple “procedural safeguards” exist, then the states must only follow 
some rule and not necessarily a specific rule.198  Moreover, 
 
                                                                                                                       
adequately rationalized as constitutional common law”). 
 192. Loliscio v. Goord, 263 F.3d 178, 188 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 193. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438 (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982)); see also 
Grano, supra note 13, at 129, 141. 
 194. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 477 n.10 (1976).  A state prisoner may assert a federal 
habeas corpus claim that he is held in violation of federal law if he can show that his incarceration is 
“a complete miscarriage of justice.”  Hussong v. Warden, 623 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)) (distinguishing Davis). 
 195. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438–39 (quoting Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 344–45 (1981) (per 
curiam)). 
 196. Klein, supra note 17, at 1054. 
 197. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 18 and 37. 
 198. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (stating that “unless other fully 
effective means are devised” by the state, this procedure should be followed). 
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[a]t common law, the opportunity for full and fair litigation of an issue 
at trial and (if available) direct appeal was not only a factor weighing 
against reaching the merits of an issue; it was a conclusive factor, 
unless the issue was a legal issue going to the jurisdiction of the trial 
court.199 
If a state makes a good faith effort to implement a particular prophylactic 
protection or devises a reasonable alternative, then a defendant’s receipt 
of either the benefit of that protection or a full and fair opportunity to 
contest its adequacy satisfies constitutional due process.  Frank and 
Moore point to the same conclusion. 
IV. USING EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS TO DENY RELIEF TO HABEAS 
PETITIONERS WHO CLAIM VIOLATIONS OF PROPHYLACTIC RULES 
OR DENIALS OF PROPHYLACTIC REMEDIES 
In his dissent in Stone, Justice Brennan opined that “[m]uch in the 
Court’s opinion suggests that a construction of the habeas statutes to 
deny relief for non-‘guilt-related’ constitutional violations, based on this 
Court’s vague notions of comity and federalism is the actual premise for 
today’s decision.”200  Though later decisions proved this comment to be 
an overstatement, Stone can, and should, be extended to deny habeas 
relief for all claims based on violations of prophylactic rules or the denial 
of prophylactic remedies. 
A. Prophylactic Rules: Costs, Benefits, and Limits 
1. The Costs and Benefits of Prophylactic Rules and Remedies 
When the Supreme Court “creates a prophylactic rule in order to 
protect a constitutional right, the relevant ‘reasoning’ is the weighing of 
the rule’s benefits against its costs.”201  “A judicially crafted rule is 
‘justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose’”202 and should 
apply “only where its benefits outweigh its costs.”203 
                                                     
 199. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 718–19 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 200. 428 U.S. 465, 516 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 201. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009). 
 202. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1220 (2010) (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 
U.S. 452, 458 (1994)). 
 203. Id. (citing Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089). 
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The most obvious benefit of prophylactic rules is the protection of 
constitutional rights that might otherwise have been compromised.204  In 
addition, these rules can promote other values, 205 as well as conserve 
judicial resources by providing easy to administer bright-line rules.206  
Those benefits, however, come at a price.207  Reliable, probative 
evidence is sometimes excluded from trial,208 and there is an overall 
“hindering [of] ‘society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and 
punishing those who violate the law.’”209  Occasionally, prophylactic 
rules and remedies “deter[] law enforcement officers from even trying to 
obtain” certain evidence out of concern that their efforts might be ruled 
improper.210   
In the abstract, the direct costs and benefits of prophylactic rules and 
remedies are difficult to measure.  Constitutional violations prevented 
and exclusions of evidence not obtained are non-events.  One cannot 
count the number non-events that did not occur.  In addition, 
administering prophylactic rules is costly in other ways.211   
In practice, any time a defendant can make a rational argument that a 
prophylactic exclusionary remedy is available, that defendant will almost 
surely file a motion to suppress any evidence obtained as result of the 
claimed violation.  These motions, and the burdensome and time-
                                                     
 204. See, e.g., id. at 1220 (“[T]he benefits of the [Edwards] rule are measured by the number of 
coerced confessions it suppresses that otherwise would have been admitted.”). 
 205. See, e.g., id. (observing that Edwards protects the integrity of the “‘accused’s choice to 
communicate with police only through counsel’” (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 291 
(1988))); Stone, 428 U.S. at 492 (majority opinion) (observing that the exclusionary rule may nurture 
respect for Fourth Amendment values and encourage police officers to incorporate those into their 
value system). 
 206. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220; see also Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or 
the Guilty?, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 551, 562 (2007) (“If [Miranda] warnings were delivered by the police 
and a waiver was given or signed, it is almost impossible to persuade a judge that the resultant 
confession or admission is “‘involuntary.’”). 
 207. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009) (“‘The value of any prophylactic 
rule . . . must be assessed not only on the basis of what is gained, but also on the basis of what is 
lost.’” (quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 161 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). 
 208. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (“The disadvantage of the 
Miranda rule is that statements which may be by no means involuntary . . . may nonetheless be 
excluded[,] and a guilty defendant [may] go free as a result.”). 
 209. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986)). 
 210. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222; see also Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091 (noting that the Jackson 
rule “deters law enforcement officers from even trying to obtain voluntary confessions”). 
 211. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091 (“[W]hen the marginal benefits of the Jackson rule are 
weighed against its substantial costs to . . . the criminal justice system, we readily conclude that the 
rule does not ‘pay its way.’” (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907–08 n.6 (1984))). 
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consuming procedures,212 hearings, appeals, and collateral attacks that 
spin off them, consume large amounts of attorney, judicial, and police 
time and energy.213  Finally, prophylactic rules and remedies, like the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule at issue in Stone, (1) shift the focus 
of the criminal proceeding away from the central issue of the defendant’s 
guilt or innocence to the collateral issue of the legality of the search and 
seizure, (2) free the guilty through the suppression of physical evidence 
that is no less reliable because of the method used to obtain it, and (3) 
offend a popular sense of justice and proportionality by undermining 
respect for the law and the administration of justice.214 
a. Shifting the Focus of Criminal Proceedings Away from the Factual 
Guilt or Innocence of the Defendant and Corrupting the Fact-Finding 
Process 
“‘[T]he ultimate objective [of our criminal justice system is] that the 
guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.’”215  Claims invoking 
prophylactic rules are, by definition, non-guilt related.  Hearings on non-
guilt-related claims divert attention “from the ultimate question of guilt 
or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal 
proceeding,”216 degrade the importance of the trial itself,217 and focus 
attention on the collateral issues of the adherence to the rules and the 
conduct of law enforcement officials.218 
The possible exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of 
prophylactic rules corrupts the judicial process.  Because the stakes are 
so high, the administration of these rules often fosters perjury on all 
sides,219 consumes “limited judicial resources,”220 and contributes to 
                                                     
 212. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93–94 (1986) (shifting the burden to the 
prosecution to show a neutral explanation for challenging jurors who are members of the same 
cognizable racial group as the defendant). 
 213. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090–91. 
 214. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489–90 (1976). 
 215. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985) (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 
(1975)). 
 216. Stone, 428 U.S. at 490. 
 217. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982). 
 218. Stone, 428 U.S. at 490–91. 
 219. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary 
Rule in Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 82–83 (1992). 
This author witnessed this firsthand as a prosecutor in the Career Criminal/Major Violators 
Unit in a district attorney’s office in Massachusetts. 
 220. Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 n.31 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) 
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court delays.221  The exclusion of evidence deprives the trier of fact of 
relevant, and often reliable, information and corrupts the fact-finding 
process. 
b. Freeing the Guilty 
The exclusion of otherwise admissible and reliable evidence because 
of the methods used to obtain it often affects the outcome of 
prosecutions.  Prosecution may become difficult or even impossible.  In 
some of these cases, the offense is minor or victimless, and the cost to 
society of a lost prosecution is minimal.  Occasionally, however, the 
prosecution of a serious offender is impossible or unsuccessful because a 
prophylactic rule or remedy bars essential evidence of guilt.222 
c. Offending a Popular Sense of Proportionality and Eroding Respect 
for the Legal System 
Most people view the criminal justice system as a mechanism to 
separate the guilty from the innocent and punish the guilty in a way that 
is reasonably proportionate to their guilt.  Most prophylactic rules do not 
advance these goals.  Moreover, exceptions comparable to the Fourth 
Amendment’s good-faith exception do not exist for violations of most 
prophylactic rules.223  When a prophylactic rule results in the release of a 
serious offender—especially when guilt appears patent—the windfall 
afforded the offender often seems disproportionate to the magnitude of 
the wrong that led to the release.  This is especially true when a serious 
criminal is released because of a minor, unintentional police mistake 
related to a prophylactic rule.224 
In all likelihood, few members of the public have any idea that 
prophylactic rules exist.  Fewer still know why they exist.  In contrast, 
evidence that is the subject of a motion to suppress may be in the public 
                                                                                                                       
(Powell, J., concurring)). 
 221. See id. 
 222. See, e.g., id. at 490 (observing that the application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule typically excludes reliable physical evidence and frees the guilty). 
 223. See, e.g., Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1845 (2009) (comparing Fifth and Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rules and prophylactic rules). 
 224. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090–91 (2009) (emphasizing the release of 
guilty criminals as “[t]he principal cost of applying any exclusionary rule” and concluding that the 
“unworkable” rule in Michigan v. Jackson “does not ‘pay its way’ [and] . . . should be and now is 
overruled” (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907–08 n.6 (1984))). 
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domain, and its import is therefore known to all.  The loss of that 
evidence seems especially galling when the police appear to have tried in 
good faith to comply with the rules at issue.  In the public’s mind, the 
offender has been released on a “technicality.”  Results of this kind pose 
an affront to popular notions of proportionality, diminish the moral force 
of the criminal law, and fuel a loss of respect for the legal system.225 
2. Judicially Created Limits on Prophylactic Remedies 
Violations of prophylactic rules rarely have consequences if the 
government either did not obtain evidence as a result of the violation226 
or declined to use it in a criminal case.227  Even if the government seeks 
to use the evidence, the benefits of prophylactic remedies do not extend 
to every person who might, in theory, seem eligible.  Some will lack 
standing to assert a claim.228  Others may be ineligible for relief for other 
reasons.229 
Concern over the costs of prophylactic rules and remedies likely has 
caused the Supreme Court to carve out exceptions allowing the use, 
under certain circumstances, of evidence obtained in violation of both 
constitutional commands and prophylactic rules.  Just as prophylactic 
rules can be violated without violating the Constitution, prophylactic 
remedies can be withheld without violating the Constitution.  In 
determining the proper scope of prophylactic remedies, the Court has 
applied a balancing test that weighs the costs of exclusion against its 
benefits.230  That test is very similar to the one used to create the rules in 
                                                     
 225. Stone, 428 U.S. at 490–91. 
 226. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003) (noting that mere compulsive 
questioning does not violate the Constitution). 
 227. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (declaring that the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule is unavailable to those whose rights were violated if “the police . . . have no 
interest in prosecuting”); see also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (rejecting the 
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule in civil cases). 
 228. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140–42 (1978) (stating that the exclusionary 
remedy is only available to a person whose legitimate personal expectations of privacy were violated 
by the contested search). 
 229. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 449–50 (1984) (admitting evidence on the basis 
that ongoing law enforcement activities would have inevitably discovered it). 
 230. Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1845 (2009).  Some constitutional guarantees mandate 
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of that guarantee whereas with others “exclusion comes 
by way of [a] deterrent sanction rather than to avoid violation of the substantive [constitutional] 
guarantee.”  Id.  In these latter cases, the Court has “applied an exclusionary-rule balancing test.”  Id. 
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the first place.231  As a result, “the scope of the remedy” for violations 
that have already occurred may be narrower than the violations.232 
In the Fourth Amendment setting, the Court has allowed the 
prosecution to use, as part of its case-in-chief, evidence obtained 
unconstitutionally but in objective, good-faith reliance on a facially valid 
warrant.233  The prosecution may also use evidence obtained in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment to impeach a defendant’s testimony.234 
The rules excluding statements made in violation of Miranda and 
Massiah v. United States235 have received similar treatment.  For 
example, the government may use, as part of its case-in-chief, some 
kinds of evidence obtained in violation of Miranda.236  Similarly, the 
prosecution may impeach the defendant with evidence obtained in 
violation of Miranda.237 
The scope of the remedy for a Massiah violation that has already 
occurred may also be narrower than the violation.238  Like Miranda, the 
Massiah right to counsel seems quasi-constitutional.  The core right to 
                                                     
 231. See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1219–20 (2010); see also New York v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657–58 (1984) (using a balancing test to create a “public safety” exception to 
the Miranda rule after “conclud[ing] that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a 
threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule”). 
 232. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1846. 
 233. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920–21 (1984). 
 234. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 
U.S. 62, 65 (1954); cf. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 319–20 (1990) (declining to extend the 
“impeachment exception” to all defense witnesses). 
 235. 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (“Defendant’s own incriminating statements, obtained by federal 
agents [through deliberate elicitation and after the commencement of criminal proceedings], could 
not constitutionally be used . . . against him at trial.”). 
 236. See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 633–38 (2008) (recognizing that the Self-
Incrimination Clause “cannot be violated by the introduction of nontestimonial evidence obtained as 
a result of voluntary statements” even if the Miranda warnings were defective or nonexistent); 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306–08 (1985) (refusing to apply the traditional “fruits” doctrine 
developed in Fourth Amendment cases to Fifth Amendment successive confession cases); Quarles, 
467 U.S. at 657–58 (creating a “public safety” exception to Miranda). 
 237. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) (holding that a defendant’s statements 
made after police wrongfully continued to question him after he asserted his Miranda rights can be 
used to impeach him because “there is sufficient deterrence when the evidence in question is made 
unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief”); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 
(1971) (holding that statements made by defendant after he was given defective Miranda warning 
may be used to impeach his credibility because if the Miranda “exclusionary rule has a deterrent 
effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is 
made unavailable to the prosecution in its case-in-chief”). 
 238. Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1846 (2009); see also Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309 (“If errors 
are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they 
should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth 
Amendment itself.”). 
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counsel is a trial right.  According to the Supreme Court, however, that 
right has been extended to “pretrial interrogations to ensure that police 
manipulation does not render counsel entirely impotent.”239  Because the 
core Sixth Amendment right is not at issue, the scope of the remedy for a 
Massiah violation that has occurred is properly determined by using a 
cost–benefit balancing test.240  Using that test, the Court concluded that 
responses to an informant’s interrogation of an uncounseled defendant 
are admissible to impeach that defendant’s trial testimony.241 
3. The Costs and Benefits of Prophylactic Rules and Remedies When 
Applied on Habeas Review 
The Court’s demonstrated willingness to balance costs and 
benefits—to limit both the reach of prophylactic rules and the application 
of prophylactic remedies—suggests that a similar balancing approach 
might be appropriate to restrict federal habeas review of all claims based 
on prophylactic rules and remedies.  In Stone, the Court held that when a 
state prisoner received a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth 
Amendment claim in state court at trial and on appeal, the prisoner “may 
not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence 
obtained in [violation of the Fourth Amendment] was introduced at his 
trial.”242  In reaching this result, the Court “weigh[ed] the utility of the 
exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it to collateral review of 
Fourth Amendment claims.”243  The Court reaffirmed its earlier view 
that—at least at trial and on direct appeal—these costs were outweighed 
by whatever deterrent effect arose from excluding evidence obtained by 
unconstitutional searches and seizures.244  The Court observed, however, 
that in the context of collateral review, the costs of the exclusionary rule  
 
                                                     
 239. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1845. 
 240. See, e.g., id. at 1846–47 (stating that because Massiah’s “right to be free of uncounseled 
interrogation . . . is infringed at the time of the interrogation,” determining whether statements 
obtained through an informant’s interrogation of an uncounseled defendant might be admissible to 
impeach that defendant’s trial testimony requires determining “the scope of the remedy for a 
violation that has already occurred”).  Justice Stevens characterized Ventris as “[t]reating the State’s 
actions in this case as a violation of a prophylactic right.”  Id. at 1848 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 241. See, e.g., id. at 1846–47; cf. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 345–46 (1990) (holding that 
evidence obtained in violation of Michigan v. Jackson can be used to impeach). 
 242. 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). 
 243. Id. at 489–94. 
 244. Id. 
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persist unchanged while the incremental deterrent effect of exclusion 
becomes so attenuated that it is outweighed by the costs.245 
A similar cost–benefit analysis applies to prophylactic rules and 
remedies.  When such claims are presented at another time and in 
another forum,246 the original distortions and disruptions are “far more 
severe.”247  If examination of these claims at trial and on direct appeal 
“stretches resources,” then examination of these claims on collateral 
review in a habeas proceeding “spreads them thinner still.”248  The ordeal 
of trial continues, and “[p]erpetual disrespect for the finality of 
convictions disparages the entire criminal justice system.”249  The costs 
of suppressing evidence—already high when suppression occurs at trial 
or on direct appeal—“are significantly magnified” when imposed by a 
federal habeas court.250  In addition, habeas review of state court 
convictions imposes its own costs, which must be added to the costs 
exacted by prophylactic rules and remedies.  As a result, the costs of this 
extra layer of review far outweigh any additional deterrent effects. 
B. Federal Habeas Review: Costs, Benefits, and Limits 
1. The Court’s Discretionary Powers and the Origin of Procedural 
Barriers to Habeas Review 
By 1886, the Supreme Court had accepted the view that the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1867 gave the federal courts the power to grant habeas 
relief to state prisoners.251  That same Act makes it clear, however, that 
the court receiving an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall have 
                                                     
 245. Id. at 493–94.  The Court further observed that Fourth Amendment claims have no bearing 
on factual guilt.  Id. at 492 n.31. 
 246. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(“When raised on federal habeas, a claim generally has been considered by two or more tiers of state 
courts.”). 
 247. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492 (1991) (referring to successive habeas petitions), 
superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254 (2006)). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 211 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 251. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886) (“[W]hile it might appear unseemly that a 
prisoner, after conviction in a State court, should be set at liberty by a single judge on habeas corpus, 
there was no escape from the act of 1867.”); id. at 249 (observing that the Act of 1867 “does not 
except from its operation cases in which the applicant for the writ is held in custody by the authority 
of a State”). 
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discretion to “‘dispose of [habeas petitions] as law and justice 
require.’”252  Because “‘habeas corpus has traditionally been regarded as 
governed by equitable principles,’”253 the Court, in exercising its 
discretion, has used a cost–benefit analysis when deciding whether to 
make federal habeas review more or less accessible.254  On some 
occasions, the Court has emphasized the benefits of habeas review and 
made it more available.255  On other occasions, it has emphasized the 
costs of habeas review and has restricted access to the writ.256  After 
Reconstruction, the Court began to limit the habeas power by focusing 
on its costs. 
In 1886, in Ex parte Royall, the Court rejected the notion “that 
[C]ongress intended to compel [the federal] courts . . . to draw to 
themselves . . . the control of all criminal prosecutions commenced in 
State courts exercising authority within the same territorial limits.”257  
The Royall Court concluded that the federal courts had the power to 
regulate the time, mode, and circumstances under which they exercised 
the broad powers conferred on them by Congress.258  More specifically, 
the Court concluded that the federal courts have the power to wrest 
custody of a habeas petitioner from the state court even before trial but 
that they “[were] not bound in every case to exercise such a power 
immediately upon application being made for the writ.”259  Instead, a 
court should take into account the relationship existing between the 
judicial tribunals of the Union and the States in deciding “whether it will 
discharge [a state prisoner], upon habeas corpus, in advance of his trial in 
the court in which he is indicted.”260  “[A]s a matter of comity, federal  
 
                                                     
 252. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 699 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1988)).  The current version of 
§ 2243 contains identical language.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006). 
 253. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986) (plurality opinion) (quoting Fay v. 
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)), 
superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254 (2006)). 
 254. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (“This Court has not ‘always followed an 
unwavering line in its conclusions as to the availability of the Great Writ.’” (quoting Fay, 372 U.S. 
at 411–12)). 
 255. See id. (giving examples of the benefits of widespread availability of habeas review). 
 256. See id. at 308–09 (noting cases that promote finality at the state court level). 
 257. 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 251, 253. 
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courts should not consider a claim in a habeas corpus petition until after 
the state courts have had an opportunity to act . . . .”261 
This limitation, which became known as the exhaustion doctrine, 
was the first of many procedural barriers to habeas review of state court 
convictions.262  These operate as gateways, or windows, through which a 
habeas petitioner’s constitutional claim must pass before a federal court 
will consider its merits.263 
At an early date, the Court recognized that a potential habeas 
petitioner could avoid the exhaustion rule by waiving, defaulting, or 
forfeiting any federal constitutional claims in state court.264  Such a 
person would meet the technical requirements for exhaustion because no 
state remedies would remain unexhausted.265  To avoid this result, and 
thereby ensure that the state courts are given the first opportunity to 
address a state prisoner’s constitutional claims, the Supreme Court 
developed the procedural-default doctrine as a kind of corollary to the 
exhaustion doctrine.266  This doctrine, the second procedural barrier that 
a habeas petitioner faces, bars habeas review of claims that the prisoner 
waived, defaulted, or forfeited in state court because he did not present 
them at the time, or in the manner, required by applicable state 
procedural rules.267  Of course, the procedural default must constitute 
adequate and independent grounds under state law for the adverse 
judgment.268 
                                                     
 261. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982) (citing Royall, 117 U.S. at 251), superseded by 
statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254 (2006)). 
 262. The exhaustion doctrine “has not been without historical uncertainties and changes in 
direction on the part of the Court.”  Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 80–81 (1977) (gathering 
cases).  The Supreme Court refined it in United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 17–19 
(1925), and Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944) (per curiam).  See Lundy, 455 U.S. at 515–16.  
Aspects of the exhaustion requirement were codified in 1948 at 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  Id. at 516 n.8. 
 263. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) (stating that a claim of actual innocence is one 
such gateway). 
 264. See In re Spencer, 228 U.S. 652, 660 (1913) (observing that the exhaustion rule “would be 
useless except to enforce a temporary delay if it did not compel a review of the question in the state 
court and, in the event of an adverse decision, the prosecution of error from this court”). 
The intimate connection between the exhaustion rules and the procedural-default rules is 
illustrated by the Court’s discussion in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1992), 
superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214. 
 265. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991). 
 266. See Spencer, 228 U.S. at 659–60 (stating that petitioner must raise claims in state court); see 
also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486–87 (1953), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214. 
 267. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. 
 268. See id. at 731–32 (noting that procedural default of a federal claim in state court would 
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With its third procedural barrier, the Court barred most successive 
habeas petitions.  In 1924, the Court “reaffirmed that res judicata does 
not apply ‘to a decision on habeas corpus refusing to discharge the 
prisoner,’”269 but recognized that successive applications for a writ could 
be limited and “‘disposed of in the exercise of a sound judicial 
discretion.’”270 
2. Lowering Procedural Barriers to Habeas Review by Focusing on the 
Benefits of Habeas Review: The Warren Court 
In 1953, the Supreme Court had just begun the process of 
incorporating various provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states 
through the Due Process Clause.271  Its decision that year, in Brown v. 
Allen—which suggested that a federal habeas court could hear any kind 
of constitutional claim brought by a state prisoner272—may well have 
reflected a perceived need for a federal forum to adjudicate and enforce 
those rights.273  That need grew ever more pressing after Brown v. Board 
of Education,274 as the civil rights struggle in the South intensified, and 
some state judges—both in the South and elsewhere—manifested a 
notorious lack of sympathy toward the federal government and toward 
the rights protected by the federal Constitution.275 
In 1963, the Supreme Court decided three cases which greatly 
expanded the availability of habeas relief by lowering the associated 
                                                                                                                       
technically satisfy the exhaustion rule, but the doctrine requires a petitioner to have raised those 
claims in state court to get federal habeas corpus review). 
 269. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 480–81 (1991) (quoting Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 
224, 230 (1924); citing Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239, 240 (1924)), superseded by 
statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214. 
 270. Id. at 481 (quoting Salinger, 265 U.S. at 231). 
 271. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949) (incorporating the Fourth 
Amendment against the states), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1963). 
 272. 344 U.S. 443, 462–63 (1953), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214; see also supra text accompanying notes 173–75. 
 273. See Developments, supra note 79, at 1059–60 (stating that Brown assumes there “is an 
interest in having a federal forum adjudicate federal constitutional claims of state prisoners”). 
 274. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 275. See generally Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court 
Authority: Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423, 1425–26, 1465–79 (1994) 
(discussing southern hostility to federal constitutional claims regarding racial discrimination); Burt 
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (discussing the preference of a federal 
forum to adjudicate federal constitutional claims).  Most judges, including many in the South, 
respected Brown’s mandate.  See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981) (discussing 
southern judges who worked to enforce Brown). 
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procedural barriers.  The first, Townsend v. Sain, held that while a federal 
habeas court must presume the validity of a state court’s findings of fact, 
it has the power to conduct a plenary fact-finding hearing if a habeas 
applicant “alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief.”276  
Further, when the facts are in dispute, such hearings are mandatory “if 
the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in 
a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding,” 
unless the habeas petitioner had deliberately bypassed state 
procedures.277  The Townsend Court stated that its holding 
“supersede[d]” Brown v. Allen “to the extent of any inconsistencies.”278 
In Fay v. Noia, the Court, purporting to apply 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) 
and (c), relaxed traditional procedural constraints regarding exhaustion279 
                                                     
 276. 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), 
superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214.  
The Townsend Court observed that the history of habeas corpus “refutes a construction of the federal 
courts’ habeas corpus powers that would assimilate their task to that of courts of appellate review.”  
Id. at 311. 
 277. Id. at 312.  The Townsend Court went on to find that an evidentiary hearing must be 
afforded a habeas applicant if 
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state 
factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding 
procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; 
(4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts 
were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears 
that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. 
Id. at 313. 
 278. Id. at 312.  In 1966, Congress enacted what the Court, referring to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), 
called “an almost verbatim codification of the standards delineated in Townsend.”  Miller v. Fenton, 
474 U.S. 104, 111 (1985).  “In the strict sense,” however, § 2254(d) did not codify Townsend 
because “[t]he listed circumstances in Townsend are those in which a hearing must be held; the 
nearly identical listed circumstances in § 2254(d) are those in which facts found by a state court are 
not presumed correct.”  Keeney, 504 U.S. at 20–21. 
It is not clear whether Townsend represented a departure from then existing law, but, in any 
event, it was overruled in Keeney.  See Keeney, 504 U.S. at 5 n.2. 
 279. 372 U.S. 391, 435 (1963) (holding that the traditional exhaustion requirement means only 
that the federal habeas applicant must have exhausted those state remedies which were “still open” 
to him “at the time he files his application in federal court”), overruled in part by Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Court continued to relax the exhaustion rule.  See, e.g., 
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42–43 (1967) (per curiam) (finding that petitioner need not return 
to state court when, because of a change in state law since his first appeals, a second effort to secure 
relief might be successful); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250–52 (1971) (per curiam) 
(finding that petitioner need not file repetitious, unknown, or futile applications to satisfy the 
exhaustion rule), superseded by statute, Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 
110 Stat. 1321–71 (codified as amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e), as recognized in 
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006); cf. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275–77 (1971) 
(holding that exhaustion applies by claim and that a petitioner need not place the correct label on the 
claim so long as he presents the substance). 
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and procedural default280 that had often barred state prisoners from 
seeking federal habeas review of their claims.  In addition, in dicta, the 
Fay Court made federal habeas corpus relief available to any state 
prisoner with any constitutional claim who had not knowingly and 
deliberately waived the federal constitutional contention.281  Writing for 
the majority, Justice Brennan found that “[a]lthough in form the Great 
Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined 
with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty.”282 
In Sanders v. United States, the Court relaxed the rules governing 
successive habeas petitions.  It held that even if a court previously 
rejected a claim on the merits, the applicant has the right to be heard 
again upon showing that “the ends of justice would be served by 
permitting the redetermination of the ground.”283  In addition, the Court 
held that a federal habeas court must relitigate a successive habeas 
petition if that petition raises new claims or claims previously raised but 
not decided on their merits, unless there has been an abuse of the writ.284 
As Justice Brennan’s comment suggests, Townsend, Fay, and 
Sanders should be viewed in their historical context.  Two years earlier, 
the Supreme Court had decided Mapp v. Ohio;285 it was rapidly applying 
more federal rights and remedies to the states.  In some places, there was 
resentment toward this trend as well as persistent resistance to 
desegregation. 
Habeas review effectively reveals286 and corrects systemic flaws and 
abuses.287  It also provides a method to correct individual abuses.288  
                                                     
 280. 372 U.S. at 438 (holding that even when a state court decision relied on adequate and 
independent state procedural grounds to bar further state litigation, the law only barred federal 
habeas relief when petitioner “deliberately by-passed” state procedures). 
 281. See id. at 433, 438–41. 
 282. Id. at 401. 
 283. 373 U.S. 1, 16 (1963).  Justice Brennan explained this result by pointing out that a state 
court judgment is a prerequisite to direct review, whereas only unlawful detention is necessary for 
habeas jurisdiction.  Fay, 372 U.S. at 416.  This reasoning has been criticized.  See, e.g., 
Developments, supra note 79, at 1104. 
 284. Sanders, 373 U.S. at 17.  The abuse-of-the-writ doctrine was later codified in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(b).  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380 n.11 (2000). 
 285. 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
 286. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 563 (1979) (explaining that federal habeas review may 
reveal hidden, systemic flaws and may have profound educational deterrent effects on state court 
judges once those flaws are revealed); Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Essay, Rethinking the 
Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 823–33 (2009) (outlining a new way 
to promote and further the goal of revealing systemic flaws and abuses). 
 287. Hoffmann & King, supra note 286, at 795–96 (arguing that the expansion of habeas review 
responded to the structural and systemic problems that existed in criminal justice in the 1950s and 
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With its decisions in these cases, the Supreme Court made it relatively 
easy for aggrieved parties to take constitutional issues away from 
possibly unsympathetic state courts and move them quickly into federal 
court. 
In 1969, in Kaufman v. United States, the Supreme Court observed 
that Fay provided a federal forum for state prisoners and gave the federal 
courts the “last say” on questions of federal law.289  Habeas review 
overcomes “the inadequacy of state procedures to raise and preserve 
federal claims, [addresses] the concern that state judges may be 
unsympathetic to federally created rights, [and deals with] the 
institutional constraints on the exercise of [the Supreme] Court’s 
certiorari jurisdiction to review state convictions.”290  Habeas review also 
helps ensure that courts respect and uniformly protect constitutional 
rights.291 
Kaufman was the high water mark in the Court’s expansion of the 
availability of federal habeas corpus.  Kaufman’s broad language 
suggests that some members of the Court believed that a federal habeas 
corpus court should decide any claims by a state prisoner alleging that a 
violation of any constitutional provision facilitated his conviction.292  
This view, however, has never been the law.293  Instead, federal courts 
                                                                                                                       
1960s and played a major role in ensuring that the states respected new constitutional rights).  
Systemic abuses still occur.  See Primus, supra note 135, at 18–23 (detailing specific abuses in 
various states). 
 288. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 322 (1979) (“It is the occasional abuse that the 
federal writ of habeas corpus stands ready to correct.” (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498–
501 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.))); Hoffmann & King, supra note 286, at 804–05. 
 289. 394 U.S. 217, 225 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted), superseded by statute, 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254 (2006)). 
 290. Id. at 225–26; see also Primus, supra note 135, at 17 (“The mainstream view today is that 
federal judges are more expert than their state counterparts, more solicitous of constitutional rights, 
more insulated from political pressure, and more able to apply uniform interpretations of federal 
law.”). 
 291. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989); Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 231.  The Kaufman 
Court conceded that these justifications were absent where federal prisoners sought habeas relief and 
noted that a district court has discretion to decline to reach the merits of a claim that had previously 
been adjudicated.  Id. at 227 n.8.  Nonetheless, it held that a federal prisoner’s “claim of 
unconstitutional search and seizure is cognizable in a § 2255 proceeding” because collateral review 
of any conviction enhances constitutional protections by ensuring that a mechanism for relief is 
always available.  Id. at 226, 231; see also Neuborne, supra note 275, at 1105–06. 
 292. See Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 223–24. 
 293. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481 n.16 (1976) (“To the extent the application of the 
exclusionary rule in Kaufman did not rely upon the supervisory role of this Court over the lower 
federal courts, the rationale for its application in [the federal] context is also rejected.” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
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exercising habeas jurisdiction have long refused to grant relief “on 
certain claims because of ‘prudential concerns.’”294 
3. Recognizing the Costs of Habeas Review 
As the Warren Court expanded the scope of federal habeas corpus 
review, critics began to observe that “‘the Great Writ entails significant 
costs.’”295  In Stone, the Court recognized that “[r]esort to habeas corpus, 
especially for purposes other than to assure that no innocent person 
suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions on 
values important to our system of government.”296  Habeas review, 
according to the Court, compromises the public interest in “(i) the most 
effective utilization of limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of 
finality in criminal trials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our 
federal and state systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the 
constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is 
founded.”297  Later cases reiterated these costs, often using slightly 
different language,298 and also observed that broad collateral review of 
state court convictions “degrades the prominence of the trial itself,” 
shifts the focus of criminal proceedings from the defendant’s factual guilt 
or innocence to the technicalities of trial or arrest, and needlessly frees 
the guilty.299  For all these reasons, critics concerned with the effect of 
habeas review on federalism often argue that if a state prisoner’s 
constitutional claim has been heard in state court, the federal courts 
should defer to the state’s disposition of the claim unless the petitioner 
can show that the state’s processes were inadequate because, for 
example, he was not provided a full and fair hearing on his claim.300 
                                                     
 294. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 699 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 295. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747–48 (1991) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 
U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (noting other views)). 
 296. Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. 
 297. Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 298. See, e.g., Engle, 456 U.S. at 127–28 (explaining that habeas review undermines the 
principles of finality by extending “the ordeal of trial” and imposes costs on the federal system by 
“frustrat[ing] both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to 
honor constitutional rights”). 
 299. Id.  To the extent that some of these costs replicate the costs of prophylactic rules at trial 
and on direct appeal, habeas review simply magnifies those costs.  See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 
U.S. 195, 211 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 300. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 156, at 522. 
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a. The Federal Caseload and the Effective Utilization of Judicial 
Resources 
There can be little doubt that “[f]ederal habeas litigation . . . places a 
heavy burden on scarce judicial resources.”301  Until the 1960s, habeas 
petitions were few in number.302  By 1978, habeas petitions constituted 
“the largest element of the civil caseload in the district courts.”303  
Currently, “[o]ver 18,000 federal habeas cases are filed each year.”304 
Critics contend that habeas review is inefficient and wastes resources 
because it involves redundancy and duplication of effort without any 
meaningful corresponding benefit.305  They further argue that the large 
volume of petitions “threatens the capacity of the system to resolve 
primary disputes,”306 causes some innocent persons to languish in jail 
while criminals argue,307 and “prejudice[s] the occasional meritorious 
application [because it is] buried in a flood of worthless ones.”308 
The large number of habeas petitions—most of which contain no 
claim that the prisoner is innocent309—should not be surprising.  The 
                                                     
 301. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 7 (1992), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2241–2254 (2006)). 
 302. In 1952, state prisoners filed 541 habeas petitions.  Brown, 344 U.S. at 536 n.8 (Jackson, J., 
concurring).  By 1962, the number of petitions had risen to 1,232.  Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 446 
n.2 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).  
“[O]ver 12,000 were filed in 1990, compared to 127 in 1941.”  Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 
697 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  In part, this increase can be 
attributed to the Court’s application to the states of more guarantees of the Bill of Rights, but it is 
clear that other forces are at work as well. 
 303. Ramsey v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 n.22 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (quoting CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 246 (3d ed. 1976)). 
 304. See Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Envisioning Post-Conviction Review for the 
Twenty-First Century, 78 MISS. L.J. 433, 436 (2008). 
 305. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 148 (1970) (“[T]he most serious single evil with today’s proliferation of 
collateral attack is its drain upon the resources of the community—judges, prosecutors, and attorneys 
appointed to aid the accused, and even of that oft overlooked necessity, courtrooms.”). 
 306. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 260 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214. 
 307. Id. at 494. 
 308. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[One] who must 
search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the 
search.”), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 
1214. 
 309. Friendly, supra note 305, at 145 (observing that “the one thing almost never suggested on 
collateral attack is that the prisoner was innocent of the crime”). 
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ready availability of habeas relief creates a powerful incentive to file for 
habeas review,310 fosters perjury, and contributes to court delays.  
Because almost every trial contains some debatable ruling, nearly every 
convicted defendant has some rational argument for relief and, thus, a 
chance for a “big score.”  Very few of these petitions, however, are 
successful.311  The result is “a substantial drain on the limited resources 
of the American criminal justice system for almost no return.”312  Given 
these realities, courts often recognize judicial economy and the 
conservation of resources as reasons to limit habeas review.313 
b. The Necessity of Finality 
The most significant cost imposed by federal collateral review “is the 
cost to finality in criminal litigation.”314 
[B]oth the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in 
insuring [sic] that there will at some point be the certainty that comes 
with an end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused 
not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on whether 
the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community.315 
“[T]his absence of finality also frustrates deterrence and 
rehabilitation.”316  “Deterrence depends upon the expectation that ‘one 
violating the law will swiftly and certainly become subject to . . . just 
punishment.’”317  Persons are more likely to engage in criminal activity if 
they believe that they might ultimately escape punishment through 
repetitive collateral attacks.318  “Rehabilitation demands that the 
                                                     
 310. Hoffmann & King, supra note 286, at 814 (“No matter how long the odds of habeas success 
may be, filing and losing is virtually cost free for prisoners.”). 
 311. King & Hoffmann, supra note 304, at 437 (noting a one-third of one percent chance that a 
petitioner will succeed in obtaining some kind of relief on habeas). 
 312. Id. 
 313. See, e.g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), superseded by statute, 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214. 
 314. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991). 
 315. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 316. Id. at 127 n.32; see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (“Without finality, the 
criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”). 
 317. Engle, 456 U.S. at 127 n.32 (quoting Bator, supra note 156, at 452 (arguing that habeas 
review undermines the rehabilitative process because rehabilitation requires the prisoner realize that 
he “is justly subject to sanction”)). 
 318. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452–53 (1986), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214. 
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convicted defendant realize that ‘he is justly subject to sanction, [and] he 
stands in need of rehabilitation.’”319 
“Finality also serves the State’s legitimate punitive interests.  When a 
prisoner is freed . . . many years after his crime, the State may be unable 
successfully to retry him”320 because of the passage of time, the 
deterioration of memories, the dispersion or death of witnesses, or the 
loss of evidence.321  If the retrial is not possible or results in a wrongful 
acquittal, a guilty individual goes free.322  Society then suffers because it 
“again finds a guilty and potentially dangerous [offender] in its midst.”323 
In practice, few habeas petitions succeed, and few prisoners win 
release from custody as a result of habeas corpus.324  Even successful 
habeas corpus claimants frequently suffer conviction upon retrial.325  
Some dangerous individuals, however, may remain free for long periods 
pending retrial.  Moreover, retrials undermine the usual principles of 
finality and extend the ordeal of trials for society, defendants,326 
witnesses, and victims who may be asked to relive their disturbing 
experience.  Retrials also impact jurors, courts, prosecutors, and defense 
counsel—all of whom must “expend further time, energy, and other 
resources to repeat a trial that has already once taken place.”327  It is not 
surprising, given all the interests advanced by finality, that the States’ 
                                                     
 319. Engle, 456 U.S. at 127 n.32 (quoting Bator, supra note 156, at 452). 
 320. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 453.  In a footnote, Justice Powell identified some additional goals 
promoted by finality, including reducing the burdens unlimited collateral attacks impose on the 
criminal justice system, reducing the friction between state and federal courts generated by state 
judges knowing that their judgments may be set aside years later by a single federal judge, and 
reducing the frustrations federal intrusions into state criminal trials impose on the “State’s sovereign 
power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.”  Id. at 453 
n.16 (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 128) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 321. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (quoting Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 453), 
superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214; 
Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 453; Engle, 456 U.S. at 127–28; but cf. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 
262 (1986) (stating that requiring the state to retry a defendant who had been convicted of murder 
twenty-three years earlier is not “an unduly harsh penalty” given the magnitude of the constitutional 
wrong despite the difficulties the state would encounter on retrial). 
 322. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 701 (1993) (O’Connor, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 323. Id. at 701. 
 324. See King & Hoffmann, supra note 304, at 437 (observing that a sampling of nearly 2,400 
petitions revealed only seven that received any sort of relief). 
 325. See id. (noting that of the seven that received relief, one petition had already been 
overturned in a year’s time). 
 326. Engle, 456 U.S. at 126–27.  “[P]risoners whose guilt is conceded or plain” have no 
legitimate interest in release; rather, they have an interest in finality.  Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 452. 
 327. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986). 
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interest in the finality of convictions is the reason most often given by 
the Supreme Court when withholding collateral review.328 
c. The Minimization of Friction Between Federal and State Courts 
Even after the passage of the Civil War Amendments, “[t]he States 
[continued to] possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the 
criminal law.”329  Thus, the states necessarily have primary responsibility 
for vindicating those constitutional rights that protect the accused in 
criminal prosecutions.330  “Reexamination of state convictions on federal 
habeas ‘frustrate[s] . . . both the States’ sovereign power to punish 
offenders and their good faith attempts to honor constitutional rights’”331 
and can adversely affect the “integrity and effectiveness of the 
substantive criminal law of the states.”332  It can also seriously erode the 
morale of state court judges who know that their judgments may be set 
aside years later by a single federal judge.333  As one author has noted: 
I could imagine nothing more subversive of a judge’s sense of 
responsibility, of the inner subjective conscientiousness which is so 
essential a part of the difficult and subtle art of judging well, than an  
 
                                                     
 328. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 
U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (“The writ strikes at finality of a state criminal conviction, a matter of particular 
importance in a federal system.”), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254 (2006)); 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976) (stating that resorting to habeas corpus for non-guilt-
related claims compromises the necessity for finality); see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 
698 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that finality is the 
most profound concern raised by collateral review). 
Finality was also a goal of the AEDPA.  See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005). 
 329. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635 (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 128).  The police power in the United 
States resides with the States; the federal government has no police power.  See U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 330. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 698 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 331. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986), superseded by statute, 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214), superseded by statute, 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214. 
 332. Bator, supra note 156, at 506; see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (“[T]he 
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal 
interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate 
activities of the States.”). 
 333. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 n.16 (1986), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214. 
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indiscriminate acceptance of the notion that all the shots will always be 
called by someone else.334 
d. The Maintenance of the Constitutional Balance upon Which the 
Doctrine of Federalism Is Founded 
Courts and commentators have often opined that habeas review 
imposes “special costs on our federal system.”335  Federalism, however, 
is a doctrine that has been invoked far more often than it has been 
defined.  At bottom, it is more historical reality than policy choice.336 
In a broad sense, federalism refers to the constitutional balance 
between the states and the federal government.337  The original 
Constitution struck one balance by imposing very few limits on the 
power of state governments beyond commanding that the states establish 
“a Republican Form of Government.”338  In contrast, it severely limited 
                                                     
 334. Bator, supra note 156, at 451.  The Court has recognized that “there is ‘no intrinsic reason 
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more competent, or conscientious, or 
learned with respect to the [applicable federal law] than his neighbor in the state courthouse.’”  
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976) (quoting Bator, supra note 156, at 509).  In many 
jurisdictions, however, state judges are elected, see William Cousins, Jr., A Judge’s View of Judicial 
Selection Plans, 76 ILL. B.J. 790, 792 tbl. I (1987), or are subject to retention votes, see Gino L. 
DiVito, HJR-CA20:ISBA’s Resolution for Merit Selection of Judges by Appointment, 76 ILL. B.J. 
784, 786 (1987).  In these jurisdictions, judges are subject to pressures from constituents who are 
often more concerned with law and order than with the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.  
Id. at 784–85 (discussing the electoral process’s effect on judicial candidates’ impartiality).  In 
addition, even when they are not subject to the ballot box, the very closeness of state judges to the 
pulse of the electorate, which federalists exalt, makes those judges more sensitive to majoritarian 
demands, id., and to the demands of powerful local interests, see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259–60 (2009) (discussing a judge’s local financial interests). 
 335. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982); see also Bator, supra note 156, at 503–07 
(discussing the tension between federal and state judges with respect to habeas review). 
 336. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a 
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1988) (“The federal system resulted from a compromise 
between those who saw the need for a strong central government and those who were wedded to the 
independent sovereignty of the states. . . . Federalism in the United States thus was born as a political 
compromise rather than as a theoretical ideal.”). 
 337. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 n.31; see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 374–75 (1976) 
(emphasizing considerations of federalism in holding that federal courts may not enjoin upper 
echelon police officials pursuant to § 1983, unless constitutional violations by subordinates are a 
result of “a ‘pervasive pattern of intimidation’ flowing from a deliberate plan” on the part of the 
named defendants (quoting Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 812 (1974))). 
 338. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 991, 1033–36 (1985) (examining the functions and virtues of the allocation of authority 
based on principles of federalism). 
Federalism is, in a sense, a core idea.  Among other things, it relates to the concentration in the 
states of many sovereign powers such as the powers to tax and spend and to make and enforce valid 
criminal laws.  See generally Merritt, supra note 336, at 2–22 (discussing the history and values of 
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the federal government by giving it only those powers specifically 
assigned to it.339  The adoption of the Civil War Amendments radically 
changed that balance.340  Those Amendments operate directly against the 
states.341  Because the passage of these Amendments settled some 
federalism issues, federalism is not a concern when the Supreme Court 
declares the existence of constitutional rights342 or when it enforces 
legislation authorized by the Fourteenth Amendment.343 
In the context of habeas review of state court convictions, federalism 
focuses on the respect the federal courts owe state court adjudications.344  
Federalism concerns are important when the Court creates prophylactic 
rules and remedies, applies them against the states, and allows their 
violation to be contested on federal habeas corpus.345 
                                                                                                                       
the separation of state and federal powers).  Its most ardent defenders view the doctrine as central to 
the avoidance of those concentrations of power that are inconsistent with the notion of limited 
government and, by their very magnitude, threaten individual liberties.  E.g., Yackle, supra, at 1036–
37.  The diffusion of the responsibility for enacting and enforcing such laws among the several states 
also recognizes political and cultural diversity and provides laboratories for social and economic 
experiments.  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State 
may . . . serve as a laboratory . . . .”). 
 339. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 340. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238–39 (1972) (“As a result of the new structure of 
law that emerged in the post-Civil War era—and especially of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
was its centerpiece—the role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights 
against state power was clearly established.”).  “The Fourteenth Amendment can only be understood 
as a whole, for while respecting federalism, it intervened directly in Southern politics, seeking . . . 
respect [for] the principle of equality before the law.”  FONER, supra note 117, at 259. 
 341. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 561–62 (1979) (observing that allegations of grand jury 
discrimination involve a direct violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which has long been held to 
operate against the state, whereas Stone merely considered “‘a judicially created remedy rather than 
a personal constitutional right’” (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 495 n.37)).  To the extent that the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates any guarantees of the Bill of Rights, those guarantees can also 
be said to operate directly against the states. 
 342. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339, 345–46 (1879).  Absent legislation passed 
under Section 5, there is “room for argument that the first section is only declaratory of [a] moral 
duty.”  Id. at 347. 
 343. See id. at 347–48 (“[T]he Constitution now expressly gives authority for congressional 
interference and compulsion in the cases embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 344. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 
722, 726 (1991)). 
 345. See supra notes 329–44 and accompanying text; see also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 
345–46 (“It is not said [the judicial power] shall be authorized to declare void any action of a State 
in violation of the prohibitions [of the Fourteenth Amendment].”). 
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e. Shifting the Focus of Criminal Proceedings Away from the Factual 
Guilt or Innocence of the Petitioners onto the Behavior of State 
Actors and Freeing the Guilty 
Most provisions of the Bill of Rights constrain the government and 
do not advance the truth-seeking function of the courts.  As a result, 
many convicted and seemingly guilty persons who claim constitutional 
violations necessarily seek relief on grounds that have no obvious 
relation to their guilt or innocence.346  When the courts hear those claims, 
the public may get the impression that the courts care more about 
“technicalities” than guilt or innocence.347 
The availability of collateral review can “give litigants incentives to 
withhold claims for manipulative purposes, [which] may create 
disincentives to present claims when evidence is fresh.”348  To the extent 
that non-guilt-related claims are reexamined on habeas review, the 
original distortions and disruptions caused by such claims349 become 
“[f]ar more severe,”350 and the chances increase that a guilty person will 
be released for reasons that are unrelated to guilt or innocence. 
4. Raising Procedural Barriers to Habeas Review by Focusing on Its 
Costs 
After Kaufman, with the help of new Justices appointed by President 
Nixon, the Supreme Court’s habeas jurisprudence shifted course.  The 
Court focused on the costs of habeas review and factual innocence, 
deferred to state processes, and began raising old barriers to habeas 
relief.  In addition, it created some new barriers.351  With Stone in 1976, 
                                                     
 346. See, e.g., Stone, 428 U.S. at 492 n.31 (“[I]n the case of a typical Fourth Amendment claim, 
asserted on collateral attack, a convicted defendant is usually asking society to redetermine an issue 
that has no bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration.”). 
 347. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 467 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting), superseded by 
statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254 (2006)). 
 348. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 7 (1992), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214; see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 
491–92 (1991), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 
Stat. at 1214. 
 349. For a description of such disruptions, see supra Part IV.A.1. 
 350. See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 492. 
 351. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977) (noting “th[e] Court’s historic 
willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even where the statutory 
language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged”). 
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the Court barred habeas courts from hearing Fourth Amendment claims 
brought by state prisoners that had received a full and fair hearing on the 
claim in state court.352  In 1990, the Court held that most new rules of 
constitutional criminal procedure did not apply retroactively to cases on 
collateral review.353  Finally, in 1993, the Court imposed a more 
demanding standard of habeas review for claims of trial-type errors 
raised on appeal than for comparable claims raised on direct review.354 
a. The Exhaustion Doctrine 
In 1981, the Court began tightening the exhaustion rule it had 
expanded eighteen years earlier in Fay v. Noia.355  In Rose v. Lundy, it 
held that the statutory-exhaustion rule requires a federal court to “dismiss 
habeas petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims.”356  
In requiring “total exhaustion,” the Lundy Court invoked federalism and 
the doctrine of comity, which it interpreted as “‘teach[ing] that one court 
should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the 
courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already 
cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the 
matter.’”357 
“Lundy’s ‘simple and clear instruction to potential litigants [was] 
before you bring any claims to federal court, be sure that you first have 
taken each one to state court.’”358  The 1996 amendments to the Habeas 
Corpus Act repeated that instruction.359 
Exhaustion “ensures that the state courts have the opportunity fully 
to consider federal-law challenges to a state custodial judgment before 
                                                     
 352. 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). 
 353. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494 (1990); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 
(1989) (applying the same idea a year earlier). 
 354. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993). 
 355. 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
 356. 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (1976)), superseded by 
statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254 (2006)).  In Fay, the Court, purporting to apply § 2254(b) and 
(c), relaxed traditional procedural constraints regarding exhaustion.  372 U.S. at 398–99. 
 357. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 518 (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)); see also 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (observing that the exhaustion doctrine is 
“grounded in principles of comity”). 
 358. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276–77 (2005) (quoting Lundy, 455 U.S. at 520); see also 
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995) (per curiam) (finding that a mere reference to the 
Constitution in state court will satisfy the exhaustion requirement for a constitutional claim). 
 359. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254. 
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the lower federal courts may entertain a collateral attack upon that 
judgment,”360 and it thereby prevents piecemeal litigation361 and channels 
claims into the appropriate forum.362  Accordingly, in 1992, the Court 
held in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes that the mere statement of a claim in 
state court does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement.363  “Just as the 
State must afford the petitioner a full and fair hearing on his federal 
claim, so must the petitioner afford the State a full and fair opportunity to 
address and resolve the claim on the merits.”364 
b. Claims Foreclosed by Procedural Default: Cause and Prejudice 
In Francis v. Henderson in 1976, the Supreme Court used 
considerations of comity and federalism to raise the bar for review of 
procedurally defaulted claims.365  The Court held that if a state court 
judgment rests on independent and adequate state grounds,366 then a 
habeas petitioner could only obtain federal review of it if he could show 
both good cause for his failure to properly raise his claim in state court367 
and actual prejudice resulting from the constitutional wrong under review.368 
                                                     
 360. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178–79 (2001). 
 361. Id. at 180. 
 362. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214. 
 363. Id. at 9–10.  In Duncan v. Henry, the Court held that a habeas petitioner who wishes to 
assert a constitutional claim must do so in both federal and state court.  513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995) 
(per curiam). 
 364. Keeney, 504 U.S. at 10. 
 365. 425 U.S. 536, 541 (1976).  The petitioner claimed that the Louisiana grand jury which had 
indicted him six years earlier had improperly excluded blacks.  Id. at 537. 
 366. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 523 (1997).  The Court further noted that: 
[t]he “independent and adequate state ground” doctrine is not technically jurisdictional 
when a federal court considers a state prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, since the federal court is not formally reviewing a judgment, but is 
determining whether the prisoner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States.” 
Id. at 523 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30, 750 (1991)).  The Court later 
observed that “[a]pplication of the ‘independent and adequate state ground’ doctrine to federal 
habeas review is based upon equitable considerations of federalism and comity.”  Id. at 523. 
 367. Francis, 425 U.S. at 542.  Good cause means an objective factor external to the defense that 
prevented compliance with relevant procedural rules.  Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986), 
superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214.  See 
also Trotter v. McKune, No. 09-3076-WEB, 2010 WL 750248, at *8 (D. Kan. Mar. 2, 2010) 
(requiring that “‘good cause’ . . . arise[] from external factors, not petitioner’s own decisions” 
(quoting Ramdeo v. Phillips, No. 04-CV-1157 (SLT), 2006 WL 297426, *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006) 
(internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 368. Francis, 425 U.S. at 542.  The Court found there was “no question of a federal district 
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The next year, in Wainwright v. Sykes, the Court held that Francis’s 
“‘cause’ and ‘prejudice’” standard should “appl[y] to a waived objection 
to the admission of a confession at trial” even if the defendant’s attorney 
waived the objection and not the defendant himself.369  The Sykes Court 
left to later decisions the task of more precisely defining its “‘cause’370 
and ‘prejudice’ test”371 but noted that state contemporaneous-objection 
rules promote finality and make the state court trial the “main event” 
rather than a “tryout on the road” to a later determinative federal habeas 
proceeding372 and therefore rejected the sweeping “deliberate bypass” 
language in Fay v. Noia.373 
In 1982, in Engle v. Isaac, the Court rejected the argument that Sykes 
should be limited to cases in which the constitutional error did not affect 
the truth-finding function of the trial.374  Four years later, however, the 
                                                                                                                       
court’s power to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in a case such as this,” but 
framed the issue as whether it was an “appropriate exercise of that power.”  Id. at 538–39. 
 369. 433 U.S. 72, 87, 90–91 (1977).  Because Sykes’ attorney failed to comply with Florida’s 
contemporaneous-objection rule and did not object at trial to testimony that he later claimed was 
admitted in violation of his Miranda rights, the Florida courts refused to hear his constitutional 
claims.  Id. at 74.  The Supreme Court rejected the habeas petition.  Id. at 91. 
 370. See, e.g., Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488 (finding that external impediments that could constitute 
sufficient cause include that (1) “the factual or legal basis for the claim was not reasonably available 
to counsel” at the time; (2) “‘some interference by [state] officials’” made compliance impracticable; 
or (3) counsel was ineffective (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 (1953), superseded by 
statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214)). 
Occasional decisions have elaborated on the meaning of state interference.  See, e.g., Banks v. 
Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 694–95 (2004) (petitioner established cause); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 
263, 289 (1999) (holding that petitioner established cause to raise a Brady claim); Amadeo v. Zant, 
486 U.S. 214, 217–24, 228 n.6 (1988) (petitioner established cause). 
Ineffective assistance of counsel is the most commonly asserted cause.  According to one 
study, out of approximately 480 cases where procedural default was claimed because of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, “in none did a federal court grant relief.”  King & Hoffmann, supra note 304, 
at 440. 
 371. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).  To establish prejudice, a petitioner 
must demonstrate that there is a “reasonable probability” that but for the constitutional error, the 
result of the trial would have been different.  A “reasonable probability” is one that “‘undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial.’”  Id. at 433–34 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 
667, 678 (1985)); cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694–96 (1984) (articulating identical 
standards for determining when ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced a defendant). 
 372. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89–90 (internal quotation marks omitted) (rejecting and overruling in part 
Fay).  Sykes only applies if a state court has rejected the petitioner’s constitutional claims on 
independent and adequate state grounds of noncompliance with state procedural rules governing the 
raising of such claims.  If a state court rejects a federal constitutional claim on the merits, then the 
cause-and-prejudice requirement does not apply and federal habeas review is available to the extent 
otherwise permitted.  See Cnty. Court of Ulster Cnty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979). 
 373. See supra notes 279–82 and accompanying text. 
 374. 456 U.S. 107, 110 (1982) (holding that a habeas petitioner who failed to comply with state 
procedural rules requiring a contemporaneous objection to jury instructions could not “challenge the 
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Court acknowledged the importance of truth finding and found that “in 
an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably 
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal 
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of 
cause for the procedural default.”375 
In later cases, the Court relied on finality, comity, and the “profound 
societal costs that attend the exercise of habeas jurisdiction,” to further 
define “cause”376 and as reasons to hold that habeas courts should 
evaluate procedural defaults on appeals under the cause-and-prejudice 
standards.377  In Coleman v. Thompson, the Court emphasized 
federalism, noted the “important interest in finality served by state 
procedural rules,”378 and explicitly held that: 
In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in 
state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural 
rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner 
can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of 
the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to 
consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of 
justice.379 
                                                                                                                       
constitutionality of those instructions in a federal habeas proceeding”). 
 375. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496.  In Sykes, the Court stated in passing that the failure to establish 
cause and prejudice would not preclude habeas review of the “federal constitutional claim of a 
defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be the victim of a miscarriage of justice.”  
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90–91, quoted in Carrier, 477 U.S. at 504 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Following 
Carrier, the Court regularly applied the miscarriage-of-justice test as an element of the default 
standard of Sykes and its progeny.  See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 700 (1993) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] sufficient showing of actual innocence . . . is 
normally sufficient, standing alone, to outweigh other concerns and justify adjudication of the 
prisoner’s constitutional claim.”). 
 376. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986).  The Court also noted “cause” did not include 
an attorney’s “deliberate, tactical decision not to pursue a particular claim” on direct appeal.  Id. at 
533–34.  See also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 486–87 (finding that an otherwise competent attorney’s 
inadvertent failure to raise a substantive claim of error on appeal did not constitute “cause”). 
 377. Smith, 477 U.S. at 533 (observing that the State’s interests in finality and efficiency are 
paramount and are the same at both the trial level and the appellate level). 
 378. 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).  Coleman’s state post-conviction counsel missed a state filing 
deadline by three days, and as a result, Coleman’s constitutional claims were not heard.  Id. at 727.  
The Supreme Court held that because there is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-
conviction proceedings, id. at 752 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556 (1987)), 
Coleman “cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings,” id. 
(citing Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587–88 (1982) (per curiam)), and “must ‘bear the risk of 
attorney error that results in a procedural default,’” id. at 752–53 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488). 
 379. Id. at 750.  The Court further observed that “[t]he cause and prejudice standard in federal 
habeas evinces far greater respect for state procedural rules than does the deliberate bypass standard 
of Fay.”  Id. at 747. 
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Finally, in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, the Court overruled Townsend 
and held that, absent a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a habeas 
petitioner who failed to develop a record in state court may not develop a 
factual record in federal court unless he can show good cause for his 
failure to develop the record in state court as well as prejudice flowing 
from that failure.380  Just as in the case of procedural default, the cause-
and-prejudice standard, according to the Keeney Court, “appropriately 
accommodate[s] concerns of finality, comity, [and] judicial economy, 
and channel[s] the resolution of claims into the most appropriate 
forum.”381 
c. Successive Petitions: Cause and Prejudice 
In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, the Court concluded that the “ends of 
justice” exception to the bar on successive habeas petitions382—which it 
set out twenty-three years earlier in Sanders v. United States383—
“require[s] federal courts to entertain [a successive] petition[] only where 
the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable 
showing of factual innocence.”384  In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
observed that it has consistently viewed habeas corpus “‘as governed by 
equitable principles.’”385  It then balanced the prisoner’s interests in 
                                                                                                                       
The Court later held that the failure to comply with a state procedural rule might not bar federal 
habeas review if (1) on the facts of the case, even perfect compliance with the rule would not have 
helped the petitioner; (2) the state has not always demanded “flawless compliance” with the rule; or 
(3) the petitioner “substantially complied” with the rule’s essential requirements.  Lee v. Kemna, 534 
U.S. 362, 381–82 (2002). 
 380. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1992), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2241–2254 (2006)).  In 1981, the Court expanded deference to state court evidentiary findings 
and limited the circumstances under which a federal court can request an evidentiary hearing.  See 
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 551–52 (1981). 
 381. Keeney, 504 U.S. at 8.  The AEDPA further “raised the bar Keeney imposed.”  Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 433 (2000). 
 382. 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214.  The Court defined a successive petition as one which “raises 
grounds identical to those raised and rejected on the merits on a prior petition.”  Id. at 444, n.6 
(citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1963)). 
 383. 373 U.S. at 16–17. 
 384. 477 U.S. at 454.  The Court further stated that this showing must be made “even though . . . 
the evidence of guilt may have been unlawfully admitted.”  Id. at 454.  The current version of 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b) narrows the broad Kuhlmann exception for successive petitioners.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b) (2006). 
 385. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 447 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963), overruled in 
part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)). 
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relitigating the “fundamental justice of his incarceration” against the 
state’s interests in finality and the administration of justice.386 
In McCleskey v. Zant, the Court observed that “[t]he prohibition 
against adjudication in federal habeas corpus of claims defaulted in state 
court is similar in purpose and design to the abuse-of-the-writ 
doctrine.”387  It held that federal habeas courts should therefore use the 
same cause-and-prejudice standard to determine whether to dismiss a 
claim in a successive habeas petition because the petitioner inexcusably 
failed to raise that claim in an initial habeas petition.388  The Court 
emphasized that “the writ strikes at finality” and noted that its 
availability “may give litigants incentives to withhold claims for 
manipulative purposes and may establish disincentives to present claims 
when evidence is fresh.”389  Additionally, federal habeas litigation 
“places a heavy burden on scarce federal judicial resources, and [it] 
threatens the capacity of the system to resolve primary disputes.”390 
The McCleskey Court observed that when a petitioner presents a 
claim for the first time in a subsequent petition, these disruptions are “far 
more severe.”391  “[T]he ordeal [of trial] worsens . . . [and] [p]erpetual 
disrespect for the finality of convictions disparages the entire criminal 
justice system.”392  Similarly, 
[i]f reexamination of a conviction in the first round of federal habeas 
stretches resources, examination of new claims raised in a second or 
subsequent petition spreads them thinner still. . . . And if reexamination 
of convictions in the first round of habeas offends federalism and 
comity, the offense increases when a State must defend its conviction 
in a second or subsequent habeas proceeding on grounds not even 
raised in the first petition.393 
                                                     
 386. Id. at 452–53.  The Kuhlmann Court identified six different goals advanced by finality or 
compromised by its ready availability.  Id. at 453–54, 454 n.16. 
 387. 499 U.S. 467, 490 (1991), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214. 
 388. Id. at 503. 
 389. Id. at 491–92. 
 390. Id. at 491. 
 391. Id. at 492. 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id.  In 1996, through the AEDPA, Congress further restricted review of claims contained in 
successive petitions.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2006). 
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d. Retroactivity and the Teague Doctrine 
In Teague v. Lane, a plurality of the Supreme Court rejected the 
retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure 
to cases on collateral review.394  The Court explained that the “‘costs 
imposed [on society] by retroactive application of new rules of 
constitutional law on habeas corpus . . . generally far outweigh the 
benefits of this application.’”395  As a result, a habeas petitioner can only 
prevail by relying on rules that had been established at the time that the 
state courts considered the petitioner’s claim.396 
Despite its status as a plurality opinion, Teague quickly morphed into 
the Court’s settled position on retroactivity.397  By 1997, the Court had 
determined that “whether a constitutional rule of criminal procedure 
applies to a case on collateral review involves [the Teague] three step 
process.”398  Thus, “the Teague principle protects not only the reasonable  
 
                                                     
 394. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion); but cf. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 
328 (1987) (holding that new rules must apply retroactively to all criminal cases pending on direct 
review). 
 395. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (quoting Salem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654 (1984) (Powell, J., 
concurring)). 
 396. O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997).  It appears that a constitutional rule is 
“new” unless all reasonable jurists would agree that it is “dictated by then-existing precedent.”  
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527–28 (1997).  It is not enough that the rule of constitutional 
law allegedly violated by the state courts was “a reasonable interpretation of prior law—perhaps 
even the most reasonable one.”  Id.  at 538.  Instead, Teague “asks whether [the outcome] was 
dictated by precedent—i.e., whether no other interpretation was reasonable.”  Id. 
If the Supreme Court was closely divided on the merits of the rule from which the petitioner 
seeks to benefit, the rule is not likely to apply retroactively.  See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 415–
16 (2004) (observing that the prior decisions relied on were 5–4 and 6–3).  “The mere existence of a 
dissent [does not, itself,] suffice[] to show that the rule is new.”  Id. at 416 n.5. 
 397. See, e.g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488–89 (1990) (recognizing the rule created by 
Teague and refusing to modify its holding); see also Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993) 
(confirming the no-other-reasonable-interpretation requirement); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. 
Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 540 (1991) (plurality opinion) (“Whereas Griffith held that new rules must 
apply retroactively to all criminal cases pending on direct review, we have since concluded that new 
rules will not relate back to convictions challenged on habeas corpus.” (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 
310)). 
 398. Beard, 542 U.S. at 411 (citing Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 527).  The first step in the Teague 
inquiry determines when the habeas petitioner’s state conviction became final.  Id.  The second step 
ascertains the “‘legal landscape as it then existed’” and asks if the rule is compelled by the 
Constitution as then interpreted.  Id. (quoting Graham, 506 U.S. at 468; citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 
U.S. 484, 488 (1990)).  If the second step determines that the rule is new—not compelled by then-
existing precedent—then the court must consider whether the rule falls into one of two exceptions to 
nonretroactivity.  Id. (citing Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 527). 
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judgments of state courts but also the States’ interest in finality quite 
apart from their courts.”399 
5. Raising the Standard of Review for Habeas Claims 
In Brecht v. Abrahamson, the Court held that the Chapman harmless-
error standard for reviewing constitutional errors—which requires that a 
court find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt400—does not 
apply to trial-type constitutional errors reviewed on habeas corpus.401  
The Court noted that the reason most often advanced for distinguishing 
between direct and collateral review—the state’s interest in finality—
worked against applying the Chapman standard.402  Instead, the Brecht 
Court held that the standard announced in Kotteakos v. United States403 
should be applied because it more properly considers the “nature and 
purpose of collateral review.”404  Using that standard, habeas courts 
should reverse only when the petitioner demonstrates actual prejudice 
and can show that “the error ‘had [a] substantial and injurious’” impact 
on the verdict.405  The general idea suggested in Brecht—that habeas 
                                                     
 399. Id. at 413.  The AEDPA adopted the suggestion that habeas relief is only necessary when a 
state court adopts unreasonable interpretations of state law or unreasonably applies the law to the 
facts.  See Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue: The 
Increased Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judgments of State Courts, 50 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 211, 214–15 (2008).  Still, “the AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct.  Thus, in 
addition to performing any analysis required by AEDPA, a federal court considering a habeas 
petition must conduct a threshold Teague analysis when the issue is properly raised by the state.”  
Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (per curiam) (citations omitted). 
Because “the Teague inquiry requires a detailed analysis of federal constitutional law,” it 
should ordinarily be postponed until after procedural bar issues are considered.  Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 
524.  It “should be addressed ‘before considering the merits of [a] claim.’”  Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994)). 
 400. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
 401. 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993).  The Supreme Court has classified errors into two categories: 
trial errors and structural errors.  Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1999).  Trial errors 
“‘occur[] during presentation of the case to the jury’ and their effect may ‘be quantitatively assessed 
in the context of other evidence presented.’”  United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 
(2006) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307–08 (1991)).  “Most constitutional errors” 
fall into the trial-error category.  Id. (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Structural errors include a complete “denial of counsel, the denial of the right of self-
representation, the denial of the right to a public trial, and the denial of the right to a trial by jury.”  
Id. at 149 (citations omitted).  Also included are racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury 
and defective reasonable-doubt instructions.  Neder, 527 U.S. at 8. 
 402. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 
 403. 328 U.S. 750, 764–65 (1946). 
 404. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637–38. 
 405. Id.  After the AEDPA, however, it is unclear “whether a federal habeas court should 
continue to apply the Brecht standard or determine instead whether the state court’s decision was 
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review should only correct the most egregious errors—was incorporated 
into the AEDPA in 1996.406 
6. Legislatively Imposed Limits on Habeas Relief: The AEDPA 
The Supreme Court’s raising and lowering of the procedural barriers 
to habeas relief left no doubt as to its equitable powers over the scope of 
the writ.  There is also “no doubt of the authority of the Congress to . . . 
liberalize the common law procedure on habeas corpus”407 and, to the 
extent permitted by the Constitution, narrow it.408  As it exists today, it 
appears that the writ has a constitutionally commanded core, but both the 
Supreme Court and Congress may expand and contract its reach. 
Over the years, Congress codified some of the Supreme Court’s 
procedural barriers.409  Until 1996, however, almost all limits on habeas 
review originated in the Supreme Court.  That year, in a major overhaul 
of habeas law, Congress passed the AEDPA and amended the Habeas 
Corpus Act.410 
The “AEDPA’s purpose [was] to further the principles of comity, 
finality, and federalism.”411  The AEDPA said nothing about the rules 
governing procedural default and left the rules governing exhaustion of 
remedies largely unchanged.412  In many other respects, however, its 
enactment “dramatically altered the landscape for federal habeas corpus 
petitions.”413  The AEDPA made it more difficult for a state prisoner to 
obtain an evidentiary hearing when he failed to develop the facts in state 
court414 and “greatly restrict[ed] the power of federal courts to award 
                                                                                                                       
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of the Chapman harmless error standard.”  
Loliscio v. Goord, 263 F.3d 178, 185 n.1 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Noble v. Kelly, 246 F.3d 93, 101 n.5 
(2d Cir. 2001)). 
 406. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (2006). 
 407. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915); see also Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 248–
49 (1886). 
 408. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008) (“‘[A]t the absolute minimum’ the 
[Suspension] Clause protects the writ as it existed when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.” 
(quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001))). 
 409. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516 n.8 (1982) (observing that in 1948, “Congress 
gave legislative recognition to the Hawk [exhaustion] rule” through § 2254 (quoting Darr v. Burford, 
339 U.S. 200, 210 (1950))), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254 (2006)). 
 410. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214. 
 411. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). 
 412. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 
 413. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005). 
 414. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 434 (observing that “the opening 
 
SCHROEDER FINAL 1/6/2012  9:52 AM 
290 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
relief to state prisoners who file second or successive habeas corpus 
applications.”415  In addition, the AEDPA added a one-year statute of 
limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus petition, which begins when 
appeals of the state judgment are exhausted,416 and added a new standard 
of review for evaluating state court determinations of fact and 
applications of constitutional law.417 
                                                                                                                       
clause of § 2254(e)(2) codifies Keeney’s threshold standard of diligence”).  Still, “in requiring that 
prisoners who have not been diligent [to] satisfy § 2254(e)(2)’s provisions rather than show cause 
and prejudice, and in eliminating a freestanding ‘miscarriage of justice’ exception, Congress raised 
the bar Keeney imposed on prisoners who were not diligent in state-court proceedings.”  Id. at 433. 
 415. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661 (2001). 
 416. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).  The AEDPA “encourages petitioners to seek relief from state 
courts . . . by tolling the 1-year limitations period while a ‘properly filed application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review’ is pending.”  Rhines, 544 U.S. at 273–76 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(2)) (discussing the rules governing “mixed” petitions—those containing both exhausted 
and unexhausted claims).  In addition, the Supreme Court has interpreted the limitations period to 
allow a kind of “equitable tolling” to avoid particularly harsh results.  See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 
130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (stating that the limitations period can be equitably tolled if a habeas 
petitioner can show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’” (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 
(2005))). 
 417. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).  As amended by the AEDPA, section 2254(d) provides: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to 
the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was 
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 
claim— 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 
or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 
In Williams v. Taylor, the Court explained: 
Under the “contrary to” clause [in the AEDPA], a federal habeas court may grant the writ 
if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a 
question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set 
of materially indistinguishable facts.  Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a 
federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing 
legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the 
facts of the prisoner’s case. 
529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). 
“‘[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of 
federal law.’”  Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410).  
“‘[C]learly established Federal law . . . refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s 
decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.’”  Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 
(2006) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412). 
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C. Extending Stone to Other Kinds of Claims 
1. Generally 
Sound reasons support the limitation of the availability of habeas 
review.  These reasons led both the Supreme Court and Congress to 
restrict access to habeas review and to make it more difficult for habeas 
petitioners to obtain relief even if their claim has some merit.  Prior to 
the adoption of the AEDPA, advocates of habeas reform proposed 
several other approaches to limit the availability of habeas.  Some 
suggested that the availability of collateral review should extend only to 
prisoners who could demonstrate innocence418 or otherwise make “a 
colorable showing of [factual] innocence.”419  Others argued for the 
limitation of review to claims that, by their very nature, bear on the 
determination of guilt or innocence.420  Still others suggested a preferred-
rights approach under which habeas courts would consider only claims 
involving “fundamental” constitutional rights.421  Finally, at least five 
Supreme Court Justices argued for a process-oriented approach to habeas 
review.422  Under this approach, habeas relief would only be available in 
                                                     
 418. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 574–75 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 419. See Friendly, supra note 305, at 151–54 (suggesting four exceptions to this bar). 
 420. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); see also 
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 278 n.10 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (questioning “whether a 
defendant should be permitted to relitigate [any] claim that has no bearing on either his guilt or on 
the fairness of the trial that convicted him”). 
It is not always obvious which types of claims bear on innocence.  Sixth Amendment claims 
have been generally seen as relating to the accuracy of the fact-finding process.  See United States ex 
rel. Sanders v. Rowe, 460 F. Supp. 1128, 1142 (N.D. Ill. 1978).  On the other hand, Fourth 
Amendment claims generally do not.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 257–58 (Powell, J., concurring).  
Some other claims, however, are more difficult to categorize.  See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 
680, 690–92 (1993) (suggesting that Miranda violations can compromise the truth-seeking process). 
In Sanders, the court referred to the distinction between a showing of innocence and a showing 
that a claim bears on innocence as “two strands” of the same argument.  460 F. Supp. at 1142. 
 421. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 538–50 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting 
collateral review should be limited to fundamental constitutional errors), superseded by statute, 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254 (2006)); Marilyn L. Kelley, Preferred Rights and Strict 
Scrutiny in the Law of Habeas Corpus, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 754, 781–82 (1978) (observing that the 
right to counsel is a “preferred right” because it is necessary to protect all other rights); Louis 
Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change 
in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 455 (1980); see also Brian M. Hoffstadt, How 
Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of Habeas Corpus, 49 DUKE L.J. 947, 1002 
(2000). 
 422. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 720 (1993) (Scalia, J., with whom Thomas, 
J., joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that an opportunity to litigate should 
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cases in which the state processes were demonstrably inadequate and the 
petitioner, therefore, did not receive a full and fair hearing on the claim 
in state court.423 
The AEDPA did not adopt any of these approaches and contains no 
categorical exclusions akin to that announced in Stone.  The Supreme 
Court has also declined to create any other categorical exclusions.  
Indeed, its restraint has been “[n]owhere . . . more evident than when it is 
asked to exclude a substantive category of issues from relitigation on 
habeas.”424 
Despite Justice Brennan’s statement in Stone that “there are no 
‘second class’ constitutional rights for purposes of federal habeas 
jurisdiction,”425 the Court seems to have made exactly that kind of 
distinction in Stone and Teague.426  It has also ranked or classified 
constitutional rights for other purposes.427  Moreover, “the Court never 
has defined the scope of the writ simply by reference to a perceived need 
to assure that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of 
constitutional error.”428  Finally, it has often treated particular 
                                                                                                                       
be dispositive unless a claim goes to the fairness and accuracy of the result); Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 
266–67 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that “a petitioner who has been afforded by the state 
courts a full and fair opportunity to litigate” a claim of grand jury discrimination should not be 
allowed to raise that claim again on federal habeas corpus); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 588 
(1979) (Powell, J., with whom Rehnquist, J., joins, concurring) (“I . . . would hold that a challenge to 
the composition of a state prisoner’s grand jury cannot be raised in a collateral federal challenge to 
his incarceration, provided that a full and fair opportunity was provided in the state courts for the 
consideration of the federal claim.”); see also Bator, supra note 156, at 492; Frank J. Remington, 
State Prisoner Access to Postconviction Relief—A Lessening Role for Federal Courts; An 
Increasingly Important Role for State Courts, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 287, 287–89 (1983) (stating that 
recent Supreme Court decisions are consistent with the proposition that habeas review can be denied 
when the validity of the claim has been adjudicated in a state court). 
 423. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 715–17 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Those 
who espoused this view argued that a state judge is just as likely, under normal circumstances, to 
reach a “correct” result as is a federal judge, Friendly, supra note 305, at 168–69, that no system of 
justice can yield “correct” results in every case even under the best of circumstances, see Bator, 
supra note 156, at 89–93, and that the Bill of Rights says nothing about guilt or innocence, but it 
says much about process, see U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.  Adherence to process is demonstrable.  
Even a judgment of doubtful accuracy may be accepted as legitimate if agreement that proper 
processes—those that were due—were followed.  See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp. 456 U.S. 461, 
481–85 (1982) (discussing res judicata and collateral estoppel). 
 424. Id. at 700 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 425. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 515 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 426. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 329 n.2 (1989) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 427. See supra note 401 (discussing the distinction between structural errors and trial-type 
errors).  See also Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1845 (2009) (distinguishing between “the core 
right to counsel” and extensions of that right). 
 428. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and 
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constitutional errors differently depending on whether they were before 
the Court on direct or collateral review.429  Thus, no inherent reason 
prevents the exclusion of a particular kind or category of claim from 
federal habeas jurisdiction.430  The Supreme Court should extend Stone 
to bar habeas review of claims involving alleged violations of 
prophylactic rules when a state court conducted a full and fair hearing on 
the alleged violation. 
2. Stone’s Progeny 
In his dissent in Stone, Justice Brennan stated that “[m]uch in the 
Court’s opinion suggests that a construction of the habeas statutes to 
deny relief for non-‘guilt-related’ constitutional violations, based on this 
Court’s vague notions of comity and federalism is the actual premise for 
today’s decision.”431  In fact, however, in only one case has the Supreme 
Court relied on Stone to deny habeas relief.  In Cardwell v. Taylor, the 
petitioner claimed that custodial statements he made to the police should 
have been excluded because they occurred after an arrest that violated 
the Fourth Amendment.432  In a per curiam opinion, the Court stated that 
“[o]nly if the statements were involuntary, and therefore obtained in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment, could the federal courts grant relief on 
collateral review.”433 
With the exception of Cardwell, the Court has declined to extend 
Stone to other types of constitutional claims.434  This does not, however, 
                                                                                                                       
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2241–2254 (2006)). 
 429. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622–23 (1993) (holding that two different 
standards apply to reviews of a Doyle error depending on whether the review is direct or collateral); 
United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783–84 (1979) (holding that a showing of noncompliance 
with the formal requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is not grounds 
for collateral relief, but that such a claim could be raised on direct appeal); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 
U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (“The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial 
that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state court’s judgment is even 
greater than the showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal.”). 
 430. This possibility was first recognized by Justice Harlan in Williams v. United States.  401 
U.S. 675, 683 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 431. Stone, 428 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 432. 461 U.S. 571, 572–73 (1983) (per curiam). 
 433. Id. at 573. 
 434. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375–80 (1986) (ineffective-assistance 
claim); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 564 (1979) (racial discrimination in jury selection); Jackson 
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323–24 (1979) (due process for insufficient evidence).  The lower federal 
courts have also been hesitant to extend Stone beyond the Fourth Amendment setting and have 
rejected its application to a wide range of claims.  See, e.g., Patterson v. Warden, 624 F.2d 69, 70 
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necessarily suggest an unwillingness to bar habeas review for claims 
founded on alleged violations of prophylactic rules.  In fact, one can 
easily distinguish each of Stone’s progeny. 
a. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
In Jackson v. Virginia, the Court rejected the argument that Stone 
should extend to bar federal habeas review of a state prisoner’s 
insufficient-evidence claim, which had been fully and fairly adjudicated 
in state court.435  The Jackson Court acknowledged the costs of habeas 
review in terms of federalism and federal–state comity, but found that the 
availability of collateral relief for claims involving the sufficiency of 
evidence imposes only a relatively small burden on the federal courts 
because most such claims are disposed of in state court.436  The Court 
observed that “whether a defendant has been convicted upon inadequate 
evidence is central to the basic question of guilt or innocence” and is “far 
different from the kind of issue” before the Court in Stone.437  It therefore 
held that even if a federal habeas applicant had a full and fair hearing on 
the issue in state court, he may seek relief if, on the evidence introduced 
at trial, “no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”438 
b. Discrimination in the Selection of Grand Jurors 
In 1977, in Castaneda v. Partida, Justice Powell, in a dissent joined 
by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and, inferentially, Justice 
Stewart, observed that “[a] strong case may be made that claims of grand 
jury discrimination are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus after 
                                                                                                                       
(9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (Fifth Amendment claims); Swicegood v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1322, 
1324–25 (5th Cir. 1978) (suggestive identification); Morgan v. Hall, 569 F.2d 1161, 1168–69 (1st 
Cir. 1978) (prosecutorial comment on post-arrest silence); Greene v. Massey, 546 F.2d 51, 53 n.6 
(5th Cir. 1977) (double jeopardy), rev’d on other grounds, 437 U.S. 19 (1978); Berg v. Morris, 483 
F. Supp. 179, 184–85 (E.D. Cal. 1980) (coerced witness testimony); United States ex rel. Burton v. 
Cuyler, 439 F. Supp. 1173, 1182 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (denial of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel), aff’d, 582 F.2d 1278 (3d Cir. 1978) (unpublished table decision). 
 435. 443 U.S. 307, 323–24 (1979). 
 436. Id. at 321–22; see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 687 (1993) (describing the 
Court’s reasoning in Jackson). 
 437. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 323.  The Jackson Court emphasized the need for federal habeas to be 
available to correct “occasional abuse.”  Id. at 322. 
 438. Id. at 324.  It had long been clear that a conviction supported by no evidence whatsoever 
cannot stand.  See Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960). 
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Stone.”439  When the issue came before the Court, however, a majority 
decided otherwise.440 
In Rose v. Mitchell, decided the same year as Jackson, the Supreme 
Court held that Stone did not preclude federal habeas corpus review of all 
non-guilt-related claims because Stone involved “the judicially created 
exclusionary rule” and was “‘not concerned with the scope of the habeas 
corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims 
generally.’”441  Discrimination in grand-jury selection, found the Rose 
majority, differed fundamentally from the Fourth Amendment issues 
raised in Stone.442  The Court based its decision on five grounds. 
First, a claim of grand-jury discrimination, in effect, claims that “the 
trial court itself violated the Fourteenth Amendment.”443  Since that very 
trial court must first rule on the discrimination claim, it is reasonable to 
doubt that the claim, if raised, will receive the full and fair hearing 
deemed essential in Stone.444 
Second, “[a]llegations of grand jury discrimination involve charges 
that state officials are violating the direct command of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,” whereas Stone involved a constitutional provision which 
had “only recently . . . been applied fully to the States” and was 
considered “‘a judicially created remedy rather than a personal 
constitutional right.’”445  Consequently, “the federalism concerns that 
motivated the Court to adopt the rule of Stone v. Powell are not 
present.”446 
Third, the Rose Court noted the Stone Court’s belief in the minimal 
deterrent value of excluding, in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.447  In contrast, 
the Rose Court stated that federal review of discrimination claims will 
likely reveal flaws not seen by those in day-to-day contact with the state  
 
                                                     
 439. 430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 440. Id. at 500–01 (majority opinion). 
 441. 443 U.S. 545, 560 (1979) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 495 (1976)). 
 442. Id. at 560–61.  In concurrence, Justice Powell argued that the Court overstated the 
difference between Stone and Rose.  Id. at 587 n.10 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 443. Id. at 561. 
 444. Id. 
 445. Id. at 561–62 (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 n.37). 
 446. Id. at 562. 
 447. Id. at 562–63. 
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system.448  Thus, habeas review will have a powerful educative and 
deterrent effect on those who operate the system.449 
Fourth, “concern[s] with judicial integrity, deprecated by the Court 
in Stone . . . [are] of much greater concern” where racial discrimination 
in grand jury selection is concerned.450  Such a claim raises constitutional 
questions that strike at fundamental societal values that are “substantially 
more compelling than those at issue in Stone.”451 
Fifth, if the claim warrants relief, then the costs of suppressing 
evidence outweigh the costs of quashing an indictment.452  The state may 
never use suppressed evidence in its case-in-chief, but often it may be 
able to pursue a new indictment.453  Under these circumstances, 
concluded the Court, “the strong interest in making available federal 
habeas corpus relief outweighs the costs associated with such relief.”454 
c. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
In Kimmelman v. Morrison, the Supreme Court held that Stone did 
not apply “to Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel where the principal [deficiency alleged] . . . is counsel’s failure 
to file a timely motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.”455  Justice Brennan’s majority 
opinion stated that Stone based its ruling on the fact that “the 
exclusionary rule [was] a ‘judicially created’ structural remedy ‘designed 
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent 
effect’” and “not a personal constitutional right” of the accused.456  Thus, 
the Stone Court properly “rested its holding on prudential, rather than 
jurisdictional, grounds”457 when it concluded that the minimal benefits of 
applying the exclusionary rule on habeas corpus review did not outweigh 
the costs to justify such review.458  In contrast, Morrison concerned a 
                                                     
 448. Id. at 563. 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id. at 564. 
 452. Id. 
 453. Id. 
 454. Id. 
 455. 477 U.S. 365, 368, 382–83 (1986). 
 456. Id. at 375–76 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)). 
 457. Id. at 379 n.4. 
 458. Justice Brennan took the opportunity to reiterate that the Court in Stone was “‘not 
concerned with the scope of the habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims 
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prisoner who sought not to obtain a remedy that compromises the truth-
seeking process, but rather to vindicate personal right-to-counsel claims 
that promote the fairness and integrity of the process.459  According to 
the Court, where violations of core constitutional rights are concerned, 
habeas relief is warranted without respect to its costs, and the Court 
therefore could not balance competing considerations and allocate the 
costs of ineffective assistance.460 
Finally, the Morrison Court observed that ineffective-assistance 
claims can often be vindicated only on collateral review.461  In contrast, 
claims based on alleged violations of prophylactic rules can also be 
vindicated at trial and on direct appeal. 
d. Miranda Claims 
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held “that when an 
individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by 
the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the 
privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.”462  Therefore, in the 
absence of other methods, the state may not use a suspect’s statement 
unless police told the suspect: (1) that he has a right to remain silent; (2) 
that if he gives up his right to remain silent, then anything he says can 
and will be used against him; (3) that he has a right to an attorney; and 
(4) that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him.463 
In 1974, the Supreme Court began to refer to the Miranda warnings 
as prophylactic464 and, in 1984, as a judicially created remedy.465  These 
                                                                                                                       
generally.’”  Id. at 376 (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 495 n.37).  He noted that the restrictions on 
federal habeas relief established in Stone were predicated on the availability “of ‘an opportunity for 
full and fair litigation’ of the constitutional claim advanced by the habeas petitioner.”  Id. at 378 n.3 
(quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 494). 
 459. Id. at 377. 
 460. Id. at 379.  Thus, where an accused is deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, the 
“federal courts may grant habeas relief in appropriate cases, regardless of the nature of the 
underlying attorney error.”  Id. at 383. 
 461. Id. at 378. 
 462. 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).  “Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the 
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly 
be the product of his free choice.”  Id. at 458. 
 463. Id. at 444–45. 
 464. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (stating that the procedural 
safeguards established in Miranda were “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but 
were instead measures to [e]nsure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was 
protected”). 
 465. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 n.3 (1984) (referring to the “judicially 
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references—coupled with Chief Justice Burger’s comment in Brewer v. 
Williams suggesting the extension of Stone to Miranda warnings because 
Miranda imposed a prophylactic rule and not a constitutional right466—
suggested that the Court had set the stage to extend Stone to Miranda.467  
Some lower federal courts shared this view,468 and one federal district 
court so held.469  Most courts faced with the issue, however, rejected the 
applicability of Stone to Miranda claims.470 
In many ways, Miranda rights seemed like a perfect candidate for an 
extension of Stone.  If Miranda is a prophylactic rule, the arguments for 
denying habeas review of alleged Miranda violations seem even stronger 
than the arguments advanced in Stone for denying such review of Fourth 
Amendment claims.471  Nonetheless, when the issue came before it in 
Withrow v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that Stone’s restriction on 
habeas jurisdiction “does not extend to a state prisoner’s claim that his 
conviction rests on statements obtained in violation of the safeguards 
mandated by Miranda.”472  This is so, wrote the majority, because the 
Miranda rule seeks not only to deter police misconduct, but also to 
uphold the adversarial nature of the criminal justice system.473  More 
fundamentally, in Stone, the Court sought to reduce both the burden that 
Fourth Amendment claims imposed on limited federal judicial resources 
and the adverse impact on federal–state relations generated by federal 
review of such claims.474  Extending Stone to Miranda claims would 
                                                                                                                       
imposed strictures” of Miranda). 
 466. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 425–29 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also id. 
at 438 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to “this Court’s procedural (as distinguished from 
constitutional) ruling in Miranda”). 
 467. In Wainwright v. Sykes, the Court specifically declined to address the question of whether 
Stone should apply to alleged Miranda violations where there is no claim that the underlying 
confession is involuntary or unreliable and where there was a full and fair opportunity to raise the 
allegations in state court proceedings.  433 U.S. 72, 87 n.11 (1977). 
 468. See, e.g., White v. Finkbeiner, 570 F.2d 194, 200 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that “a forceful 
argument” could be made for extending Stone to Miranda claims). 
 469. See Richardson v. Stone, 421 F. Supp. 577, 578–79 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
 470. See, e.g., Patterson v. Warden, 624 F.2d 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Harryman v. 
Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 872 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); Smith v. Wainwright, 581 F.2d 1149, 1151 
(5th Cir. 1978); Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185, 1189 (2d Cir. 1978); Berg v. Morris, 483 F. 
Supp. 179, 184 n.3 (E.D. Cal. 1980); Cannistraci v. Smith, 470 F. Supp. 586, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 
United States ex rel. Sanders v. Rowe, 460 F. Supp. 1128, 1142 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Szaraz v. Perini, 
422 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
 471. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 701–02 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 472. Id. at 683. 
 473. See id. at 690–93. 
 474. Id. at 687. 
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accomplish neither objective because it “would not prevent a state 
prisoner from simply converting his barred Miranda claim into a due 
process claim resting on an involuntary confession.”475  Indeed, the 
extension of Stone to Miranda claims would not even remove the 
Miranda issue from habeas review because determinations of 
voluntariness inquire as to whether the police officer informed the 
confessing defendant of his rights.476 
Because the “Court’s rationale necessarily determines whether a rule 
is prophylactic,”477 one need not view Withrow as a repudiation of the 
thesis that habeas review of claimed violations of prophylactic rules and 
remedies should be denied.  If Miranda is a constitutionally mandated 
prophylactic rule, as the Court said a few years later in Dickerson,478 then 
the availability of habeas relief on collateral review automatically 
follows.  If the Withrow Court simply anticipated Dickerson, then its 
decision is consistent with a bar on habeas review of claims based on 
alleged violations of prophylactic rules.  Moreover, the other arguments 
set out by the Withrow majority do not compel the rejection of such a 
bar. 
3. Equitable Considerations Should Bar Habeas Review of Claims 
Based on Prophylactic Rules that Received a Full and Fair Hearing 
in State Court 
The equitable considerations that the Court noted in Stone—and that 
it has long used to raise and lower procedural barriers to habeas relief—
should preclude a habeas court from reaching the merits of state prisoner 
claims based on alleged violations of prophylactic rules of criminal 
procedure unless the prisoner can show that he “was denied an 
opportunity for a full and fair litigation of [his] claim at trial and on 
direct review” and that there was, in fact, a violation.479  The arguments 
for denying habeas relief advanced in Stone—where the Court was  
 
                                                     
 475. Id. at 693. 
 476. Id. at 693–94. 
 477. Grano, supra note 13, at 115. 
 478. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437–38, 444 (2000) (acknowledging earlier 
references to the Miranda warnings as “prophylactic” and not constitutionally protected rights, but 
nevertheless considered them a “constitutional rule”). 
 479. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 495 n.37 (1976).  Cf. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 
456 U.S. 461, 482–83, 483 n.24 (1982) (discussing the meaning of “full and fair”). 
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dealing with a Court-created remedy—apply with equal or greater force 
to any claim based on a Court-created prophylactic rule or remedy.480 
A line dividing prophylactic rules and remedies from claims based 
on constitutional mandates is entirely within the control of the Supreme 
Court, and it is relatively clear and easy to administer.  It is also 
principled.  Prophylactic rules and remedies are not direct commands of 
the Constitution; they are Court-created rules and remedies.481  The 
violation of such rules or the denial of such remedies is therefore not a 
constitutional wrong in its own right.  “If the principles of federalism, 
finality, and fairness ever counsel in favor of withholding relief on 
habeas, surely they do so where there is no constitutional harm to 
remedy.”482 
Concededly, the impact of the rule suggested here might be slight.  
For one thing, habeas courts rarely issue writs on the basis of violations 
of prophylactic rules or denials of prophylactic remedies.  Second, in 
Withrow, the Court focused on the argument that denying habeas review 
of Miranda claims would not significantly reduce the number of petitions 
filed by prisoners483 because most Miranda claims can be reformulated 
as constitutional claims.484  The same reality might apply to a rule 
denying habeas review of petitions raising claims based on prophylactic 
rules and remedies.  Many habeas claims based on alleged violations of 
prophylactic rules could also be reformulated as constitutional claims. 
Because most habeas petitioners are motivated by a desire to obtain 
release from incarceration—rather than a desire to vindicate any 
particular claim—most are likely to simply translate their claims into 
whatever claims the courts seem willing to hear.  This task may not, 
however, be as easy as it appears at first glance.  Miranda claims may be 
uniquely suited to reformulation because the giving of the Miranda 
                                                     
 480. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 702 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 209–12 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Maine v. Moulton, 
474 U.S. 159, 192 (1985) (Burger, J., dissenting) (arguing that some Sixth Amendment claims 
“‘closely parallel claims under the Fourth Amendment’” (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 
414 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring))); United States ex rel. Sanders v. Rowe, 460 F. Supp. 1128, 
1143 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
 481. See Withrow, 507 U.S. at 701–02 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(observing that prophylactic rules are not products of the Constitution, but rather are judicially 
created); United States ex rel. Sanders v. Rowe, 460 F. Supp. 1128, 1143 n.44 (N.D. Ill. 1978) 
(gathering cases that discuss “the apparent subconstitutional nature of the fourth amendment and 
Miranda exclusionary rules”). 
 482. See Withrow, 507 U.S. at 707 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 483. See id. at 694–95. 
 484. See id. at 693 (suggesting that Miranda claims could be converted into due process claims). 
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warnings is one of many factors a court looks to in determining whether 
a confession was voluntary.485  Moreover, in many cases, if the 
constitutional claim were viable, the petitioner would have raised it in his 
petition along with the prophylactic rule claim. 
Finally, the Withrow Court emphasized that “Miranda safeguards ‘a 
fundamental trial right’”486 and “serves to guard against ‘the use of 
unreliable statements at trial.’”487  The rights protected by many other 
prophylactic rules are not necessarily trial rights.488  More fundamentally, 
however, the use of prophylactic exclusionary remedies, including those 
relied on to bar un-Mirandized statements, seems more likely to hinder, 
rather than advance, the search for truth. 
In any event, these pragmatic concerns should be largely irrelevant to 
the propriety of habeas review of prophylactic-based claims.  Denying 
review in those cases where no underlying constitutional violation is 
claimed will not infringe on constitutional protections.  At the same time, 
if even a few petitions are barred by this rule, some time and resources 
will be saved.  “The relative infrequency of relief, however, does not 
diminish the intrusion on state sovereignty” and does not reduce the 
diversion of resources necessary for states to defend claims and for 
courts to litigate them.489  Finally, if relief is truly rare, “efficiency 
counsels in favor of dispensing with the search for the prophylactic rule 
violation in a haystack.”490 
An exception allowing habeas review in cases where there was not a 
full and fair hearing on a prophylactic rule claim in state court is 
analogous to the rule in Stone and is similar in its essential premise to the 
holdings in Frank and Moore.  In Frank, the Court upheld the 
petitioner’s conviction because the state court’s processes, including its 
corrective processes, provided adequate protection.491  In Moore, the 
Court reversed because the state processes provided inadequate 
                                                     
 485. See id. at 693–94 (noting the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, listing factors, citing 
cases, and suggesting Miranda claims’ convertibility). 
 486. See id. at 691 (quoting United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)). 
 487. Id. at 692 (quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966)). 
 488. See Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1845–47 (2009).  Claims based on Fourth 
Amendment violations are probably the most difficult to reformulate, but even these can often be 
transformed into ineffective-assistance of counsel claims.  See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 
U.S. 365, 377–83 (1986) (rejecting defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim, which was reformulated 
as an ineffective-assistance claim, but giving it considerable attention). 
 489. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 713 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 490. Id. 
 491. See generally supra notes 146–52, 154, 160–61 and accompanying text. 
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protection.492  The Second Circuit synthesized a rule from all three 
decisions which allows habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims 
in only one of two instances: (a) if the state has provided no corrective 
procedures at all to redress the alleged fourth amendment violations; or 
(b) if the state has provided a corrective mechanism, but the defendant 
was precluded from using that mechanism because of an 
unconscionable breakdown in the underlying process.493 
This rule should govern habeas review of all claims based on claimed 
violations of prophylactic rules and remedies. 
 In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court observed that “[t]he idea that the 
necessary scope of habeas review in part depends upon the rigor of any 
earlier proceedings accords with our test for procedural adequacy in the 
due process context.”494  When the Supreme Court incorporates a 
constitutional provision against the states through the Due Process 
Clause and acknowledges that multiple “procedural safeguards” exist, 
then the states must only follow some rule and not necessarily a specific 
rule.495  If a state makes a good-faith effort to implement a particular 
prophylactic protection—or devises an alternative—and the defendant 
receives either the benefit of that protection or a full and fair opportunity 
to contest its adequacy, then the defendant received the process that was 
due under the Constitution.  “[T]he privilege of habeas corpus entitles the 
prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held 
pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant 
law.”496  It should not be construed to afford him every possible 
opportunity to vindicate each and every claim in each and every forum. 
Finally, as Justice Scalia noted in Withrow, under existing law, a 
habeas court always “ha[s] ‘discretion’ to refuse to reach the merits of a 
constitutional claim that ha[s] already been raised and resolved against 
the prisoner” after a full and fair hearing in state court.497  Claims based 
                                                     
 492. See generally supra notes 153–60, 162 and accompanying text. 
 493. Capellan v. Riley, 975 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 
840 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc)). 
 494. 553 U.S. 723, 781 (2008). 
 495. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (citing the proposition that “unless 
other fully effective means are devised by the state, this procedure should be followed”); cf. Franks 
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (specifically acknowledging the continued value of the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, at least “in the absence of a more efficacious sanction,” in 
cases involving “substantial and deliberate” Fourth Amendment violations). 
 496. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 553 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)). 
 497. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 720 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
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on prophylactic rules usually challenge process; they rarely raise 
questions about guilt or innocence.498  When such a claim implicates 
questions of guilt or innocence, there is good reason for a habeas court to 
exercise its discretion in favor of review.499 
V. CONCLUSION 
Thirty-two years ago, in Rose v. Mitchell, Justice Powell, joined by 
Justice Rehnquist, wrote: 
In expanding the scope of habeas corpus . . . the Court seems to have 
lost sight entirely of the historical purpose of the writ.  It has come to 
accept review by federal district courts of state-court judgments in 
criminal cases as the rule, rather than the exception that it should be.500 
This statement remains true today, even though the Stone Court 
suggested a principled, though partial, solution to the problem.501 
The Supreme Court should rule that federal habeas courts lack 
jurisdiction over state prisoner claims based on alleged violations of 
prophylactic rules because persons in custody as a result of such 
violations are not “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States.”502  Alternatively, the Court should limit 
habeas review of such claims by using the equitable considerations that it 
outlined in Stone and that it has long used to raise and lower procedural 
barriers to habeas relief. 
The Court should revive and extend Stone to bar habeas review of all 
claims based on prophylactic rules when the petitioner received a full 
and fair hearing on the claim in state court.  Several reasons support this 
argument.  First, the “exceptional conditions” that drove the expansion of 
                                                                                                                       
in part) (citing Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 n.8 (1969)). 
 498. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 416 (1990) (observing that a violation of the 
restrictions on police investigations imposed in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), “would 
not seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination” and “may increase that 
likelihood”); cf. Philip Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After 
Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 40 (1982) (suggesting that exclusion of statements obtained 
in violation of Miranda frequently enhances reliability); but see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions 
and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 891 (1981) (arguing against the extension of Stone). 
 499. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 720–21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(distinguishing Jackson, Rose, and Kimmelman on this basis). 
 500. 443 U.S. 545, 581 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 501. 428 U.S. 465, 494–95 (1976). 
 502. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006). 
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habeas review—the civil rights revolution and the criminal procedure 
revolution—have passed into history.  Historically, the Court has been 
“willing[] to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, 
even where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has 
remained unchanged.”503  Second, habeas review protects constitutional 
values; prophylactic rules also protect constitutional values.  Protecting 
the rules rather than the underlying values protects the protector; it is not 
the best use of limited resources.  Third, violations of prophylactic rules 
ordinarily have no bearing on factual guilt or innocence.  Fourth, “habeas 
corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable 
principles.”504  Where the state court provided the prisoner with a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate his claim, federal habeas corpus review 
adds very few benefits and exacts high costs.  Fifth, the Court has often 
reminded the judiciary that “the writ should be available to afford relief 
to those ‘persons whom society has grievously wronged.’”505  Congress 
recognized the same thing in the AEDPA.  Given the quasi-constitutional 
status of prophylactic rules and remedies, it is difficult to see how their 
violation can qualify as a “grievous wrong” that in equity and good 
conscience justifies the costs of correcting it on collateral review in 
federal court. 
                                                     
 503. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 
779 (2008) (the “precise application and scope [of habeas corpus has] changed depending upon the 
circumstances”). 
 504. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 
72 (1977). 
 505. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986) (quoting Fay, 372 U.S. at 440–41), 
superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254 (2006)). 
